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AGENCY LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
Jarrod Shobe*
No tool of statutory construction has drawn as much scholarly and judicial
attention and controversy as legislative history. This Article shows that the
standard account of legislative history often fails to account for legislative
history generated through agency–Congress legislative communications, which
are often among the most relevant legislative history. These communications,
which this Article terms “agency legislative history,” have important
implications for theories and the practice of statutory interpretation and agency
delegation.
The account of agency legislative history provided here offers a new
perspective on the legislative history debate and questions of how empirical
realities of the legislative process should influence statutory interpretation.
Agency legislative history also sheds new light on the ongoing debate over
Chevron’s domain. Agency legislative history reinforces arguments in favor of
deference to agencies by raising novel questions about courts’ institutional
capacity to effectively uncover congressional deals, and by providing new
reasons to believe that agencies may be better statutory interpreters than courts.
At the same time, for the many judges skeptical of broad deference but unsure
how to limit it, agency legislative history can allow for more narrowly tailored
and empirically supported deference decisions that reflect the variety of ways
legislation is made.

*
Associate Professor of Law, Brigham Young University. For helpful discussions and comments on
earlier drafts of this Article, I am grateful to Paul Stancil, Aaron Nielson, Chris Walker, Bijal Shah, Seth Davis,
and participants in the Rocky Mountain Jr. Scholars Forum and the BYU law faculty workshop. For excellent
research assistance I am grateful to Jessica Payton, Stephanie Nielson, Jeff Cottle, Ryan Ricks, and Jake Barney.

SHOBE_PROOFS2

284

1/14/2019 2:20 PM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 68:283

INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................. 285
I. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY’S DOMAIN .................................................... 291
II. TYPES OF AGENCY LEGISLATIVE HISTORY ....................................... 293
A. Formal vs. Informal Agency Legislative History ...................... 293
B. Agency-Proposed Legislation ................................................... 295
C. Agency Involvement in the Drafting Process ............................ 297
D. Agency Legislative Analysis ..................................................... 299
1. Section-by-Section Analyses ............................................... 300
2. Views Letters ...................................................................... 301
3. Pre-Drafting Reports and Memos ...................................... 302
4. Agency Testimony ............................................................... 303
5. Courts’ Use of Agency Legislative Analysis ....................... 304
E. Accessibility of Agency Legislative History .............................. 308
III. IMPLICATIONS OF AGENCY LEGISLATIVE HISTORY ........................... 313
A. Implications for Deference ....................................................... 313
1. Support for Deference ........................................................ 314
2. Concerns with Deference ................................................... 317
3. Contextual Deference ......................................................... 321
B. Implications for Interpretation ................................................. 328
1. Interpreting Statutes in Light of Agency Legislative
History ................................................................................ 328
2. Agency Legislative History and Empirical Realities of the
Legislative Process ............................................................. 331
CONCLUSION ................................................................................................. 332

SHOBE_PROOFS2

2018]

1/14/2019 2:20 PM

AGENCY LEGISLATIVE HISTORY

285

INTRODUCTION
Whether, and how, to use legislative history continues to be the most hotly
contested issue in statutory interpretation.1 This controversy is understandable
given how important legislative history has been in many of the most noteworthy
judicial decisions of the last forty years.2 In this debate, legislative history’s
domain is traditionally thought to begin and end with congressional documents,
actions, or inactions.3 Absent from the discussion of legislative history is almost
any mention of agency communications with Congress throughout the
legislative process,4 even though agencies are often intimately involved in

1
See, e.g., Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretation from the Inside—An
Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part I, 65 STAN. L. REV. 901, 964
(2013) [hereinafter Gluck & Bressman, Part I] (“The other primary interpretive source that courts consider—
and the one whose use is most hotly contested—is legislative history.”); Stephen Breyer, On the Uses of
Legislative History in Interpreting Statutes, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 845, 845–46 (1992); George A. Costello, Average
Voting Members and Other “Benign Fictions”: The Relative Reliability of Committee Reports, Floor Debates,
and Other Sources of Legislative History, 1990 DUKE L.J. 39, 39–42 (1990); William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New
Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621, 623 (1990) (“The new textualism posits that once the Court has ascertained
a statute’s plain meaning, consideration of legislative history becomes irrelevant.”); William N. Eskridge, Jr.,
Textualism, the Unknown Ideal?, 96 MICH. L. REV. 1509, 1512–13 (1998); Abbe R. Gluck, Intersystemic
Statutory Interpretation: Methodology as “Law” and the Erie Doctrine, 120 YALE L.J. 1898, 1909–10 n.22
(2011); John F. Manning, Textualism as a Nondelegation Doctrine, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 673, 687–88 (1997);
Jane S. Schacter, The Confounding Common Law Originalism in Recent Supreme Court Statutory
Interpretation: Implications for the Legislative History Debate and Beyond, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1, 3, 6 (1998).
2
MANNING & STEPHENSON, infra note 3, at 127; see Gluck, supra note 1. For a few recent Supreme
Court examples where legislative history was contested, see Mohamad v. Palestinian Auth., 566 U.S. 449, 459
(2012) (arguing that the statutory text is clear and legislative history therefore unnecessary); id. at 461 (Breyer,
J., concurring) (disagreeing that the text is clear and arguing in favor of considering the legislative history);
Coleman v. Court of Appeals of Md., 566 U.S. 30, 44–45 (2012) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (arguing
against the plurality’s use of legislative history and in favor of considering the text alone); Reynolds v. United
States, 565 U.S. 432, 448 n.* (2012) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority’s use of legislative history
is “superfluous”); Gonzalez v. Thaler, 565 U.S. 134, 165–66 (2012) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (providing a critique
of the use of legislative history); DePierre v. United States, 564 U.S. 70, 89 (2011) (Scalia, J., concurring in part
and concurring in the judgment) (arguing that the use of legislative history is “not harmless”); Bruesewitz v.
Wyeth LLC, 562 U.S. 223, 240 (2011) (acknowledging that the use of legislative history is not considered
legitimate by all judges).
3
These sources of legislative history are covered exhaustively in various leading textbooks on
legislation. See, e.g., WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION AND
REGULATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY (5th ed. 2014); JOHN F. MANNING & MATTHEW
C. STEPHENSON, LEGISLATION AND REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 142 (2d ed. 2013). For interesting
cases on the use of legislative inaction as a source of legislative history, see FDA v. Brown & Williamson
Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 146–47 (2000); Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 600–01, 607
(1983).
4
For a comprehensive discussion of the different types of legislative history, see MANNING &
STEPHENSON, supra note 3, at 136–45. The current hierarchy of legislative history sources does not always
exclude noncongressional sources, but “nonlegislator statements” are rarely referenced and generally thought of
as being one of the least authoritative forms of legislative history. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 222 (1994).
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drafting, revising, and negotiating legislation because of their on-the-ground
expertise.5
Although scholars and courts traditionally imagine a sharp divide between
legislation passed by Congress and implementation by agencies, this Article
shows that in reality, there is often a blurred line—with Congress
communicating with agencies to understand how they intend to implement
statutes and agencies communicating with Congress in a variety of ways and at
various stages of the legislative process to influence drafting.6 These
communications are often an integral part of forming Congress’s intentions and
expectations with respect to legislation. It is not surprising that the specifics of
these communications have gone mostly unrecognized and untheorized given
how little scholars have studied agencies’ role in the legislative process.7 The
lack of understanding about agency–Congress interactions is problematic
because it has at times created a mismatch between current statutory
interpretation and agency delegation debates, and the realities of the legislative
process. This Article aims to remedy this by providing a typology and analysis
of these agency–Congress legislative interactions, which this Article collectively
terms “agency legislative history.” In doing so, it provides a new perspective on
what legislative history is, which is relevant to both textualists who eschew
congressional legislative history and purposivists who embrace it.
To understand the implications agency legislative history could have for
interpretation, consider the following hypothetical scenarios. Suppose Congress
has passed legislation requiring the EPA to implement new environmental
restrictions on coal-burning power plants. Throughout the process leading up to
enactment, Congress worked closely with the EPA, and the EPA provided
hundreds of pages of background material, dozens of hours of testimony, several
written letters detailing the Agency’s concerns with the legislation, and a number
5
Various recent empirical studies have discussed the role of agencies in the legislative process generally.
See Lisa Schultz Bressman & Abbe R. Gluck, Statutory Interpretation from the Inside—An Empirical Study of
Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part II, 66 STAN. L. REV. 725, 758 (2014) [hereinafter
Gluck & Bressman, Part II]; Jarrod Shobe, Agencies as Legislators: An Empirical Study of the Role of Agencies
in the Legislative Process, 85 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 451, 454 (2017) [hereinafter Shobe, Agencies as Legislators];
Jarrod Shobe, Intertemporal Statutory Interpretation and the Evolution of Legislative Drafting, 114 COLUM. L.
REV. 807, 863–64 (2014) [hereinafter Shobe, Intertemporal Statutory Interpretation]; Ganesh Sitaraman, The
Origins of Legislation, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 79, 132 (2015); Christopher J. Walker, Legislating in the
Shadows, 165 U. PENN. L. REV. 1377, 1378–79 (2017).
6
This Article focuses on formal agency communications, which generally occur in written form or in
formal settings, because these are most likely to be accessible to courts and the public and are more likely to
reflect the position of an agency as a whole rather than an individual agency staffer. See infra Section II.A.
7
Professors Farber & O’Connell made similar arguments for modern regulation generally. See Daniel
A. Farber & Anne Joseph O’Connell, The Lost World of Administrative Law, 92 TEX. L. REV. 1137, 1140 (2014).
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of written explanations of how the legislation would work on the ground. Much
of these materials ended up in congressional committee reports. The owner of a
coal-burning power plant has challenged the EPA’s implementation of the
legislation. Should the EPA’s voluminous communications with Congress
influence a judge’s approach to statutory interpretation and deference?
Now suppose Congress passed a different bill, which was drafted almost
entirely by the Department of Defense (DoD). The relevant congressional
committee also adopted, as part of its own committee report, language from a
section-by-section analysis of the bill provided by the DoD. A number of years
later, after the election of a new President, the Department interprets the statute
in a way that goes against the description it provided to Congress in the sectionby-section analysis, although arguably within the scope of the somewhat vague
legislative language. Should a judge interpreting the statute consider the fact that
the bill came directly from the DoD when deciding whether to defer to the
agency’s interpretation? Should a purposivist judge give more or less weight to
the agency’s analysis included in the committee report than other legislative
history? And should a textualist judge treat the agency’s analysis included in the
committee report like any other legislative history and exclude it from
consideration?
Alternatively, suppose an agency sends a letter to Congress opposing a bill
and proposing modifications. Congress, despite the agency’s protestations, votes
to pass the bill unchanged. A group challenges the agency’s interpretation of the
statute. Should a court consider the interactions between the agency and
Congress when deciding whether to defer to the agency’s interpretation?
This Article begins to examine how courts could approach questions like
these in light of the existence of agency legislative history. One way it does this
is by looking at how courts have used agency legislative history in situations
similar to those described above. Based on the author’s extensive search of
references to agency legislative history in judicial decisions, some courts have
used it to help determine whether to uphold agency statutory interpretations,
albeit infrequently, inconsistently, and predominantly in the pre-Chevron era.8
This earlier practice appears to have been mostly lost to modern developments
in statutory interpretation and agency delegation, which perhaps helps explain
why it has received scant attention from scholars. These pre-Chevron cases

8

See infra Part II.
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provide useful examples of how modern courts could, or perhaps should not,
apply agency legislative history in the future.9
Agency legislative history is also relevant to ongoing debates about
Chevron’s domain. A number of scholars and judges have advocated for a broad
application of Chevron that allocates interpretive authority to agencies instead
of the judicial branch.10 These arguments are often based on agencies’ relative
expertise and institutional competence.11 Agency legislative history lends
support to these arguments by showing that the creation of legislation is a multilayered and multi-actor process that often turns on bargains necessary to achieve
enactment that may be impossible, or at least incredibly costly, for a court to
uncover. It also shows that agencies may be better statutory interpreters than
courts because they have rich legislative repositories that record and explain
statutory deals and purposes.12 These records are often inaccessible to courts,
and even if they were available they would be difficult and time-consuming for
generalist judges, entirely absent from the legislative process, to make sense of.
Perhaps, in light of agency legislative history, we should be even more skeptical
of courts’ ability to enter into the legislative “black box”13 and should instead
fall back to a more formalist approach to deference that, while “fictional,”
provides the best background presumption against which Congress can legislate.
Another concern in light of agency involvement in the legislative process,
raised by Professors Walker and Sitaraman, is that Chevron allows agencies to
potentially be both drafters and interpreters of legislation, creating a potential
for agency self-dealing without judicial oversight.14 They analogize this to Auer
9

See infra Part II.
VERMEULE, infra note 12, at 206; William N. Eskridge, Jr., Expanding Chevron’s Domain: A
Comparative Institutional Analysis of the Relative Competence of Courts and Agencies to Interpret Statutes,
2013 WIS. L. REV. 411, 427 (2013); Jerry L. Mashaw, Prodelegation: Why Administrators Should Make Political
Decisions, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 81, 91–99 (1985); David B. Spence & Frank Cross, A Public Choice Case for
the Administrative State, 89 GEO. L.J. 97, 134–41 (2000).
11
Supra note 10.
12
In this way this Article builds on scholarship by Professors Mashaw and Strauss that argues that
agencies should approach interpretation different from courts because of their unique position and relationship
with Congress. See, e.g., ADRIAN VERMEULE, JUDGING UNDER UNCERTAINTY: AN INSTITUTIONAL THEORY OF
LEGAL INTERPRETATION 205–08 (2006); Jerry L. Mashaw, Norms, Practices, and the Paradox of Deference: A
Preliminary Inquiry into Agency Statutory Interpretation, 57 ADMIN. L. REV. 501, 504 (2005) (“There are
persuasive grounds for believing that legitimate techniques and standards for agency statutory interpretation
diverge sharply from the legitimate techniques and standards for judicial statutory interpretation.”); Cass R.
Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, Interpretation and Institutions, 101 MICH. L. REV. 885, 928 (2003).
13
Richard H. Pildes, Institutional Formalism and Realism in Constitutional and Public Law, 2013 SUP.
CT. REV. 1, 2 (2013).
14
Sitaraman, supra note 5, at 86; Walker, supra note 5, at 1411 (“If the agency is indeed a partner with
Congress in the legislative drafting, Justice Scalia’s concern about an agency legislating and executing the law
10
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deference, whereby courts defer to agency interpretations of their own
regulations, and argue that because of this concern perhaps courts should move
away from Chevron toward the less deferential Skidmore standard.15 This
analogy certainly sounds alarming, however no research to date, including this
Article’s findings, has shown that Congress has ceded all or even a significant
portion of its legislative authority to agencies. And courts have not appeared
concerned about this risk. In fact, this Article shows that courts appear to take
agency involvement as a signal from Congress of an intent to defer to the agency
rather than as raising an issue of potential self-dealing.
While a blanket presumption against delegation would be an overly broad
response to agency involvement in the legislative process, judges concerned
more generally about deference to agencies could use agency legislative history
to defer in more contextual ways.16 Despite the fact that scholars and judges have
written volumes about when and how Chevron should apply, they have been
unable to articulate a coherent and predictable set of rules to determine when to
defer. If judges wish to approach Chevron in a more contextual way, this Article
provides new avenues that would allow them to do so in ways that better reflect
the realities of agency–Congress relationships and Congress’s own chosen
legislative process. Agency legislative history may often provide the best
evidence of whether Congress intended to delegate with respect to a particular
ambiguity. Indeed, as discussed above, pre-Chevron courts often looked to
agency legislative history as a means of discerning whether to defer to an agency
interpretation, so in many ways this would simply be a return to prior judicial
practice. This Article provides a path forward for judges looking to trade

should apply with some force to legislative drafting. The executive and legislative functions are, in essence,
combined via agency legislating in the shadows.”).
15
Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461–63 (1997). But see Talk Am., Inc. v. Mich. Bell Tel. Co., 564 U.S.
50, 69 (2011) (Scalia, J., concurring) (criticizing Auer because “deferring to an agency’s interpretation of its
own rule encourages the agency to enact vague rules which give it the power, in future adjudications, to do what
it pleases”).
16
A number of Supreme Court Justices have recently expressed concern with the expansion of the
administrative state. City of Arlington v. FCC, 569 U.S. 290, 315 (2013) (Roberts, C. J., dissenting) (“[T]he
danger posed by the growing power of the administrative state cannot be dismissed.”); see also Dep’t of Transp.
v. Ass’n of Am. R.Rs., 135 S. Ct. 1225, 1254 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment) (describing the
administrative state as a system that “concentrates the power to make laws and the power to enforce them in the
hands of a vast and unaccountable administrative apparatus”). For an excellent discussion of the rise of the
administrative state, see Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the Administrative State, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1231,
1233 (1994).
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universalist theories of agency delegation for modes of deference based on the
variety of ways legislation is made.17
Agency legislative history also has implications for the substantive
interpretation of statutes. If Congress uses its legislative history to memorialize
an understanding reached with an agency and to hold the agency to the bargain
it made during the legislative process, it would make sense for a court to give
that a privileged place in its statutory analysis. It may be that recent skepticism
towards legislative history has caused courts to deemphasize these types of
communications. But courts that ignore legislative history need to be aware that
they might also be ignoring important evidence of agency–Congress legislative
deals. It would seem that even a textualist judge would view agency legislative
history as distinct from other legislative history. Textualists are concerned about
individual members or staffers using Congress’s legislative history to do an “end
run” around the constitutionally prescribed process,18 but by ignoring agency
legislative history and deferring to agency interpretations, courts are potentially
allowing agencies to do an “end run” around Congress. So even if textualists
choose to ignore other legislative history, they should still consider agency
legislative history, especially when the alternative is simply to defer to an
agency.
Agency legislative history has implications for current debates surrounding
how empirical realities of the legislative process should influence statutory
interpretation.19 These debates have focused on the role of congressional staff as
the creators of legislative policy and legislative history, and legislative counsel
as technical statutory drafters.20 Agency legislative history indicates that these
accounts are oversimplified. These debates have not accounted for the variety of
roles agencies play throughout the legislative process. For example, they have
not accounted for the role of agencies as statutory drafters and revisers, nor have
they accounted for the fact that congressional legislative history is sometimes a
reflection of statements made by an agency to Congress rather than an internally
generated congressional understanding. Agency legislative history shows that
the process of generating both statutory text and legislative history is even more
variable and messy than is commonly thought, which calls into question existing

17
This is something the Supreme Court has explicitly pursued. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S.
218, 236 (2001) (“Justice Scalia’s first priority over the years has been to limit and simplify. The Court’s choice
has been to tailor deference to variety.”).
18
Manning, infra note 34, at 1534.
19
See infra Section III.B.
20
See infra Section III.B.
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arguments about how empirical realities of the legislative process should
influence interpretation and delegation.
This Article proceeds in three Parts. Part I provides background on the use
of legislative history generally and recent empirical scholarship on the
legislative process. Part II describes the various types of agency legislative
history, provides examples of each type, and explains how courts have used it,
predominantly in the pre-Chevron era. Part III discusses the implications of
agency legislative history for theories of agency deference and statutory
interpretation.
I.

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY’S DOMAIN

Scholars and judges generally think of legislative history as the entire set of
circumstances surrounding the conception, deliberation, drafting, and amending
of a piece of legislation.21 The standard textbook account of legislative history
includes a wide variety of sources, including the general circumstances
surrounding the introduction and consideration of legislation, committee reports,
conference reports, statements by sponsors or drafters of legislation, the record
of changes to the legislation over the course of the drafting process, hearings,
floor debates, post-enactment legislative history, and legislative inaction.22 This
broad account of legislative history generally focuses on those within Congress
who are thought to be most closely involved in creating legislation, including
congressional committees and those individual members of Congress who have
worked with those committees to shepherd the legislation through the legislative
process.23 Rarely in discussions of legislative history is any serious
consideration given to agency communications with Congress throughout the
legislative process.24 This is true even though agencies are often intimately
involved in drafting, revising, and negotiating legislation, and the legislative
process often turns on agreements between an agency and Congress over what
certain provisions mean and how they will be implemented.25 This Article
focuses on this overlooked type of legislative history, which it terms “agency

21
WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., INTERPRETING LAW: A PRIMER ON HOW TO READ STATUTES AND THE
CONSTITUTION 191 (2016) [hereinafter ESKRIDGE, JR., INTERPRETING LAW].
22
These sources of legislative history are covered exhaustively in various leading textbooks on
legislation. See ESKRIDGE, JR., supra note 4; supra note 3 and accompanying text.
23
ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., supra note 3, at 632.
24
“The court does not rely on statements by nonlegislative officials as the most probative evidence of the
meaning of statutory language. There are very few state cases and those that exist reject the use of such evidence
of statutory meaning.” Id. at 828; e.g., Hayes v. Cont’l Ins. Co., 872 P.2d 668, 673–74 (Ariz. 1994).
25
See supra note 24.
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legislative history,” and argues that it may be, in many instances, the most
illuminating and accurate legislative history. This Article contributes a novel
typology of agency legislative history that sets a base for discussions of how
courts and scholars should account for agency legislative history as a unique
form of legislative history.
The fact that agency legislative history is so rarely discussed is unsurprising,
because, although observers have long suspected that agencies play some role in
creating legislation,26 what that role is and how it works has only recently come
into focus. Recent articles by Professor Walker27 and Professor Sitaraman,28 as
well as the author’s own research,29 have provided a window into the ways
agencies are involved in creating the legislation they are charged with
implementing. Other recent empirical studies of the legislative process have
hinted more generally at agency involvement in the legislative process.30 And
some prominent scholars have implied that courts (and scholars) should consider
agency–Congress legislative communications, but only in a very general and
speculative manner.31 Even the few scholars who have directly addressed the
26
Peter L. Strauss, Essay, “Deference” Is Too Confusing—Let’s Call Them “Chevron Space” and
“Skidmore Weight”, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1143, 1146 (2012) [hereinafter Strauss, “Chevron Space” and
“Skidmore Weight”] (“The agency may have helped to draft the statutory language, and was likely present and
attentive throughout its legislative consideration. Its views about statutory meaning may have been shaped in the
immediate wake of enactment, under the enacting Congress’s watchful eye.”); see Matthew R. Christiansen &
William N. Eskridge, Jr., Congressional Overrides of Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 1967–
2011, 92 TEX. L. REV. 1317, 1323, 1377 (2014) (providing evidence that agencies work with congressional staff
to draft override legislation, and lobby for such legislation, based on an examination of committee hearings and
reports).
27
Walker, supra note 5. Professor Walker’s article was part of a larger project commissioned by the
Administrative Conference of the United States. CHRISTOPHER J. WALKER, FEDERAL AGENCIES IN THE
LEGISLATIVE PROCESS: TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE IN STATUTORY DRAFTING (2015).
28
Sitaraman, supra note 5, at 124–32.
29
See Shobe, Agencies as Legislators, supra note 5.
30
See Brigham Daniels, Agency as Principal, 48 GA. L. REV. 335, 404 (2014) (“Sometimes Congress
asks agencies to draft language, and sometimes agencies do so without being asked. It is just the way the game
is played, and those with much experience in Washington openly acknowledge this.”); Gluck & Bressman, Part
I, supra 1, at 1021 (“There are likely external networks of these noncongressional drafters of federal legislation,
with deep resources of institutional and legal knowledge, that may influence statutory drafting in ways that have
been underappreciated and merit their own separate study.”); Gluck & Bressman, Part II, supra note 5, at 758
(“[O]ur respondents told us that first drafts are typically written by, respectively, the White House and agencies,
or policy experts and outside groups, like lobbyists. Empirical work is lacking for the details of this account . . .
.”); Nicholas R. Parrillo, Leviathan and Interpretive Revolution: The Administrative State, the Judiciary, and the
Rise of Legislative History, 1890–1950, 123 YALE L.J. 266, 338–42 (2013) (documenting the key role of
agencies in the legislative process during the New Deal era as part of a larger study of the rise of the use of
legislative history); Christopher J. Walker, Inside Agency Statutory Interpretation, 67 STAN. L. REV. 999, 1004
(2015) [hereinafter Walker, Inside Agency].
31
ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., supra note 3, at 829 (“Indeed, since proposed legislation is frequently drafted by
the executive department or by private interest groups, their statements and explanations at hearings might be
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issue of agency involvement in the legislative process have focused on what this
involvement means generally, without fully examining the many ways in which
agencies communicate legislatively with Congress and how and why this should
matter for statutory interpretation.32 The next Part begins to unpack these
agency–Congress legislative interactions by considering the various types of
legislative communications between agencies and Congress.
II. TYPES OF AGENCY LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
Much like congressional legislative history, agency legislative history comes
in many different forms. This Part discusses various types of agency legislative
history and gives real-world examples of them. The goal of this Part is to show
how common agency legislative history is, and that it comes in a variety of
forms. This Part also documents, based on an extensive search of references to
agency legislative history in judicial decisions, how the various types of agency
legislative history have influenced statutory interpretation. While scholars have
rarely discussed the existence of agency legislative history, courts have, albeit
infrequently and quietly, used agency legislative history as part of interpretation
for many decades.33 This Part discusses a number of cases, covering each only
briefly, with a focus on how agency legislative history influenced the decision.
These cases mostly come from the pre-Chevron era when courts used a case-bycase approach to determine whether to defer to agency interpretations instead of
Chevron’s broad presumption of deference. Importantly, in this era courts also
relied more heavily on legislative history generally, and the recent deemphasis
of legislative history may have also reduced judicial reliance on agency
legislative history.34 This discussion provides background for discussions in Part
III of what agency legislative history could mean going forward for theories and
the practice of statutory interpretation.
A. Formal vs. Informal Agency Legislative History
This section distinguishes two broad types of agency–Congress
communications that are part of the history of a piece of legislation. First are
informal agency–Congress legislative communications, like phone calls and
the only truly informed explanation of the structure and operation of the statute.”); ESKRIDGE, JR., INTERPRETING
LAW, supra note 21, at 256.
32
See Shobe, Agencies as Legistalators, supra note 5; Shobe, Intertemporal Statutory Interpretation,
supra note 5; Walker, Inside Agency, supra note 30; Walker, Legislating in the Shadows, supra note 5.
33
See cases cited infra note 54.
34
See John F. Manning, Chevron and Legislative History, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1517, 1525 n.46
(2014).
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emails between staffers. Second are formal written or spoken communications
with Congress, which are generally documented and often publicly available.
This section briefly discusses informal agency–Congress communications,
while the rest of this Part focuses primarily on the many types of formal agency–
Congress communications.
Agency staff frequently engage congressional staff on an informal basis,
including by email, by phone, and in person.35 This type of interaction is perhaps
the most frequent contact between agencies and Congress and occurs at the staff
level with no oversight from the Office of Management and Budget (OMB).36
These interactions could often provide helpful illumination into the purpose and
meaning of statutory language. In a perfect world, judges would have access to,
and be able to make sense of, all relevant information about the legislative
process, including informal and formal communications between agencies and
Congress. Of course, it is difficult or impossible to gain access to informal
communications between agencies and Congress, and even if judges could, it
would be difficult for them to know how to account for different types of
informal communications. The same is true of internal congressional
deliberations. For example, although conversations among congressional staff
or between congressional staff and Congress’s professional drafters in the
offices of legislative counsel might be the most valuable legislative history, no
one has seriously argued that every internal congressional email and
conversation be made available to a judge interpreting a statute.
Although a good deal of the legislative communications between agencies
and Congress are informal, agencies often engage Congress in various formal
ways.37 These formal communications generally must be cleared through OMB
and are then submitted to Congress in written form.38 For this reason, the focus
of this Article is on formal agency legislative history that is more likely to be
accessible to courts and the public, more salient to all of Congress (or at least
congressional committees), and more likely to reflect the position of an agency

35

See Shobe, Agencies as Legislatures, supra note 5, at 489.
Id.
37
See infra Sections II.B–II.D.
38
The Mission and Structure of the Office of Management and Budget, OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET,
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/omb/organization_mission/ (last visited Oct. 20, 2018). These documents
are often publicly available through agency websites or can be made available through FOIA requests. A number
of websites request agency documents through FOIA and post them online. For example, the website
governmentattic.org has posted certain Department of Justice views letters acquired through FOIA requests on
their website. See, e.g., Copies of Certain Department of Justice (DOJ) Views Letters from the 107th and the
108th Congresses, 2001-2005, GOVERNMENTATTIC.ORG (Feb. 1, 2016) [hereinafter Copies of Certain Views
Letters, 2001-2005], http://www.governmentattic.org/19docs/DOJviewsLetters_2001-2005.pdf.
36
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as a whole rather than an individual agency staffer. The remainder of this Part
describes the most common forms of formal agency legislative history and
provides real-world examples of them.
B. Agency-Proposed Legislation
The most prominent kind of formal agency legislative history is agencydrafted legislative proposals. Agencies often draft their own statutory language,
reflecting their policy preferences, which they then submit to Congress in hopes
that Congress will use it as a starting (or even ending) point to the legislative
process.39 This form of agency legislative history generally shows a high level
of agency sophistication and involvement in the legislative process. Agency
drafting can happen for a one-time bill that an agency wants enacted or as part
of an ongoing agency–Congress relationship. For example, Congress considers
certain bills, like the National Defense Authorization Act and the Farm Bill, on
a regular basis, and the agencies affected by those bills frequently draft proposals
they hope Congress will include in those bills.40 Other times an agency sees a
39
Shobe, Agencies as Legislators, supra note 5, at 468 (“[A]gencies commonly originate their own
legislative proposals and also draft legislation at Congress’s request”). That the Executive Branch would propose
legislation is anticipated by the Constitution. The Recommendation Clause, found in Article II, Section 3, states
that “[The President] shall from time to time . . . recommend to [Congress’s] Consideration such Measures as
he shall judge necessary and expedient . . . .” U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. This provision underwent multiple drafts
and the changes provide helpful context of what the Framers expected out of the President from this Clause. In
an earlier draft the Clause allowed the President to recommend legislation but did not require him to do so. See
J. Gregory Sidak, The Recommendation Clause, 77 GEO. L.J. 2079, 2081 (1989) (“James Madison’s notes on
the Constitutional Convention for August 24, 1787, reveal that the Framers explicitly elevated the President’s
recommendation of measures from a political prerogative to a constitutional duty . . . .”). An earlier version also
contained the word “matters” rather than “measures.” Id. at 2084. This change “reinforces the inference that the
Framers intended the President’s recommendations to be more than precatory statements . . . .” Id. This indicates
that the Framers intended the President to make specific legislative proposals in the form of bill language. See
Vasan Kesavan & J. Gregory Sidak, The Legislator-in-Chief, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 48–49 (2002); Shobe,
Agencies as Legisltaors, supra note 5, at 469 (“It is no secret that the President proposes bills to Congress. But
where does that language come from? It doesn’t appear by magic. Someone in an agency is the one who wrote
it.”). Agency proposals are sometimes made public by the agency as part of the President’s budget or as part of
the agency’s process of promoting the proposal. Some agencies post their legislative proposals on their website.
For example, the Department of Transportation recently drafted an expansive proposal to fund improvements to
transportation infrastructure. Although the Department of Transportation is the lead agency, the 350-page draft
bill includes roles for various agencies, including the EPA, Department of Interior, and Department of Labor.
See, e.g., GROW AMERICA Act, H.R. 2410, 114th Cong. (2015), https://www.transportation.gov/sites/dot.gov/
files/docs/GROW_AMERICA_Act_1.pdf (describing roles for various departments).
40
Congress has enacted a version of the National Defense Authorization Act every year since at least
1961. See HOUSE ARMED SERVS. COMM., HISTORY OF THE NDAA, https://armedservices.house.gov/ndaa/
history-ndaa (last visited Oct. 20, 2018) (providing links to each National Defense Authorization Act since
1961). The DoD has an Office of Legislative Counsel whose job is to oversee the agency’s legislative proposals
for the National Defense Authorization Act. See DEP’T OF DEF., OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL, AN
OVERVIEW OF DOD’S LEGISLATION PROGRAM 4 (2006).
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particular need that is not being properly addressed by existing law, either
because of a change in circumstances, a judicial opinion, or a poorly drafted or
underspecified statute, so it will propose a legislative change to Congress. Either
way, the fact that an agency was the primary drafter of legislation is a relevant
part of the legislative history of a bill from which courts have drawn inferences
about congressional intent to delegate, as discussed below.41
Courts have occasionally considered the fact that an agency proposed or
opposed the language at issue when determining whether and to what degree
they should defer to agency interpretations of statutes.42 These courts have
essentially created a canon of interpretation that affords greater deference to an
agency where the agency drafted the relevant language. As the Court said in
United States v. American Trucking Associations, “the Commission’s
interpretation gains much persuasiveness from the fact that it was the
Commission which suggested the provisions’ enactment to Congress.”43 In a
rare post-Chevron case invoking agency legislative history—Zuni Public School
District No. 89 v. Department of Education—Justice Breyer, writing for the
majority, took the unusual step of considering the fact that the Department of
Education had originally drafted the language at issue before he looked to the
language of the statute.44 Based partially on the Department of Education’s
involvement in the legislative process, which was noted in the Congressional
Record,45 the Court determined that Congress must have intended to defer to
agency interpretations of the statute.46 Judges have relied on similar reasoning
in a number of earlier Supreme Court and lower court opinions.47
41

See Section III.A.
See cases cited infra note 47.
43
310 U.S. 534, 549 (1940).
44
550 U.S. 81, 98 (2007).
45
139 Cong. Rec. 2,599 (1993) (House sponsor of the bill referring to the bill as “the administration’s
proposal.”); Id. at 23,416 (Senate sponsor of the bill stating the bill was introduced by the agency. E.g., “I am
pleased to introduce on behalf of the administration . . . .”; “The administration is proposing”; and “The
administration’s proposal calls for . . . .”).
46
Zuni Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 89, 550 U.S. at 98. Several Justices went out of their way to disavow Justice
Breyer’s approach and to encourage the use of the traditional Chevron method. Id. at 107 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
47
Id. at 90 (examining the legislative history and finding that the “present statutory language” had come
from draft legislation that the Secretary of the Department of Education had submitted to Congress in 1994);
Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 239 (2005) (“[T]he Department of Labor . . . initially drafted the
legislation [being examined in the case.]”); Howe v. Smith, 452 U.S. 473, 485 (1981) (arguing that “the Bureau’s
interpretation of the statute merits greater than normal weight because it was the Bureau that drafted the
legislation and steered it through Congress . . . .”); United States v. One Bell Jet Ranger II Helicopter, 943 F.2d
1121, 1126 (9th Cir. 1991) (“The interpretation of the agency charged with administering the statute is entitled. . .
to ‘greater than normal weight’ when that agency drafts the legislation and steers it through Congress with little
debate.”); Watkins v. Blinzinger, 789 F.2d 474, 478 (7th Cir. 1986) (arguing that when an agency drafted
42
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The Supreme Court has also considered Congress’s rejection of an agency
legislative proposal as a useful way of inferring congressional intent. In
Nacirema Operating Co. v. Johnson,48 the Court considered that Congress had
passed the legislation at issue despite Department of Labor opposition. The
Department of Labor wanted broader legislation and proposed language to that
effect, but Congress rejected the Department’s proposal and instead adopted a
bill with narrow language.49 The Court used Congress’s rejection of the
Department of Labor’s position to argue that the ambiguous statutory language
should be construed in a narrow manner that went against the agency’s preferred
interpretation.50 This shows that courts could benefit from looking at both
positive and negative interactions between agencies and Congress when
determining whether to defer to an agency interpretation.
C. Agency Involvement in the Drafting Process
Another type of agency legislative history is agency involvement in
reviewing and drafting legislation for which it was not the primary drafter.
Because of their comparative expertise, Congress often allows agencies to be
closely involved in reviewing and commenting on proposed legislation drafted
within Congress or by other outside parties.51 This can happen in a variety of
ways, either at Congress’s request or through an agency’s own monitoring of
legislation.52 As the author has described elsewhere, this involvement can be
substantial or minor depending on the issue and the relationship between the

language courts should defer unless the interpretation is “beyond the pale of reasonableness”); W. Nuclear, Inc.
v. Andrus, 664 F.2d 234, 240 (10th Cir. 1981); Beshaw v. Fenton, 635 F.2d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 1980) (stating that
the agency interpretation was given more weight because it drafted the section at issue and got it through
Congress); Saldivar v. Rodela, 894 F. Supp. 2d 916, 930 (W.D. Tex. 2012); Creaton v. Bowen, No. CV 85-3306R, 1986 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25485, at *12 (C.D. Cal. 1986).
48
396 U.S. 212, 217–18 (1969).
49
Id. (“In fact, a representative of the Labor Department objected to the bill precisely for that reason,
urging the Committee to extend coverage to embrace the contract, ‘and not the man simply when he is on the
ship.’ If Congress had intended to adopt that suggestion, it could not have chosen a more inappropriate way of
expressing its intent than by substituting the words ‘upon the navigable waters’ for the words ‘within the
admiralty jurisdiction.’”).
50
Id.
51
Shobe, Agencies as Legislators, supra note 5, at 468 (“[A]gencies provide extensive review of, and
revisions to, statutory language drafted by outside agencies.”). Of course, it is not always possible for a court to
determine whether an agency was involved in drafting. But, often it is. Although it is more difficult to tell when
an agency proposed edits to a bill, it is not uncommon for agencies to submit edits as part of a views letter or
through other public means. There are also strong indicators of when an agency did not draft language. For
example, if an agency or administration issues a views letter or testifies in opposition of a bill, or certain sections
of a bill, then it would seem likely that the agency did not draft, and was not heavily involved in reviewing, the
bill or those sections of the bill.
52
Id.
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agency, Congress, and Congress’s own internal expertise.53 The level and type
of involvement can serve as a useful signal of the agency–Congress relationship
and is another relevant part of the legislative history of an enacted statute.
Courts have often considered agency participation in creating legislation as
a factor in their decisions.54 The Supreme Court has generally treated agency
participation in the legislative process the same as when the agency was the
original drafter, as discussed in the previous section, by creating a canon
whereby the Court granted greater deference when an agency was involved in
creating the statute at issue.55 To quote the Court in Miller v. Youakim,
“[a]dministrative interpretations are especially persuasive where, as here, the
agency participated in developing the provision.”56 An earlier case, Adams v.
United States, invoked a similar idea: “These agencies cooperated in developing
the Act, and their views are entitled to great weight in its interpretation.”57 The
Court never made it clear why agency involvement alone was enough to create
a presumption of deference, but implicit in these cases seems to be a desire not

53

Id. at 482.
See, e.g., Aluminum Co. of Am. v. Cent. Lincoln Peoples’ Util. Dist., 467 U.S. 380, 390 (1984) (noting
that the agency “was intimately involved in the drafting and consideration of the [Regional Act] by Congress”);
Guardians Ass’n v. Civil Serv. Comm’n of the City of New York, 463 U.S. 582, 592 (1983); Pub. Util. Dist. No.
1 of Douglas County v. Bonneville Power Admin., 947 F.2d 386, 390 (9th Cir. 1991) (arguing that because the
agency was involved in drafting the court should defer unless the interpretation is unreasonable); Aluminum Co.
of Am. v. Bonneville Power Admin. 903 F.2d 585, 590 (9th Cir. 1990) (same); Cal. Energy Res. Conservation
& Dev. Co. v. Johnson, 807 F.2d 1456, 1459 (5th Cir. 1987) (same); Almendarez v. Barrett-Fisher Co., 762 F.2d
1275, 1282 n.3 (5th Cir. 1985); Sweeny v. Murray, 732 F.2d 1022, 1029 (1st Cir. 1984) (arguing that greater
deference should be given when agency played a role in drafting statute); McDannell v. U.S. Office of Pers.
Mgmt., 716 F.2d 1063, 1066 (5th Cir. 1983) (giving greater deference to the Office of Personnel Management
(defendant-appellant) in their interpretation of the statute because their predecessor agency had “an actual hand
in its drafting and passage”); Int’l Nutrition, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 676 F.2d 338, 342
(8th Cir. 1982) (arguing that because the FDA participated in drafting the statute, the court defers to its
interpretation, as long as that interpretation furthers goals of legislation); Comm. for Auto Responsibility v.
Solomon, 603 F.2d 992, 1004 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (noting that the General Services Administration had been
actively involved in drafting and adopting the statutory language that was in dispute in the case); Hercules, Inc.
v. EPA, 598 F.2d 91, 125 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Morgan v. United States, No. CV 84-4664 (RR), 1991 WL 353371,
at *4 (E.D.N.Y. June 30, 1991) (“It is axiomatic that where an agency assists in the drafting of legislation and
aids in its passage, it views on that legislation are entitled to great deference.”); Air Courier Conference of
Am./Int’l Comm. v. U.S. Postal Serv., 762 F. Supp. 86, 88 (D. Del. 1991) (noting that “due deference” was
supported by the fact that Postal Department officials had participated in the Act’s drafting); Faught v. Heckler,
577 F. Supp. 1180, 1186 (S.D. Iowa 1983); Turney v. United States, 525 F. Supp. 675, 677 (D. Md. 1981)
(“Administrative interpretations are especially persuasive where, as here, the agency participated in developing
the provision.”); Am. Waterways Operators, Inc. v. United States, 386 F. Supp. 799, 804 (D.D.C. 1974) (“Of
higher significance, however, is the construction placed on an act by those administrators who participated in its
drafting and directly made known their views to Congress.”).
55
See supra Section II.B.
56
440 U.S. 125, 144 (1979).
57
319 U.S. 312, 315 (1943).
54
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to interfere with the work of agencies that were much closer to the legislative
process and therefore better able to interpret the statute.58
Courts have placed caveats on this general presumption of greater deference
to agency interpretations when the agency participated in the legislative process.
For example, in Barnett v. Weinberger, the D.C. Circuit declined to defer to an
agency interpretation of a statute that the agency helped draft because the
agency’s interpretation came many years after the statute was enacted.59
Conversely, in Peters v. City of Shreveport, the Fifth Circuit upheld an agency
interpretation made soon after enactment of the legislation, noting that when “an
administrative interpretation . . . is made contemporaneously with the enactment
of the statute, courts give the construction more deference” because the agency
is “in a position to accurately interpret the [statute] in accordance with
Congress’s intentions.”60 These caveats to the general rule of deferring when an
agency is involved in the legislative process make sense because when an agency
interprets a statute many years after enactment, it is unlikely that interpretation
is based on the agency’s proximity to the legislative process and Congress’s
intent.
D. Agency Legislative Analysis
Agencies communicate with Congress during the legislative process in ways
beyond drafting and revising legislation, yet these types of legislative
communications have gone almost entirely unnoticed in legal literature.
58
See cases cited supra note 54. Courts that have applied this canon of greater deference have not
automatically accepted agency interpretations. Aluminum Co. of Am., 903 F.2d at 594, 598–99 (noting that the
commission had a significant role in drafting the legislation); Watkins v. Blinzinger, 789 F.2d 474, 478 (7th Cir.
1986) (stating that the court should defer to agency interpretations where the agency drafted the language, unless
the interpretation is “beyond the pale of reasonableness”); Cent. Lincoln Peoples’ Util. Dist. v. Johnson, 735
F.2d 1101, 1106 (9th Cir. 1984) (noting that the commission had a significant role in drafting the legislation);
Watts v. Hadden, 686 F.2d 841, 843 (10th Cir. 1981) (same); Patagonia Corp. v. Bd. of Governors, 517 F.2d
803, 811, 813 (9th Cir. 1975) (noting that the agency suggested the language at issue but still relying on an
analysis of the meaning of the words to rule against the agency). Much like in Chevron, these courts have still
looked to whether the interpretation was “permissible” or “reasonable.” Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def.
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 840, 866 (1984). The Supreme Court in Zuber v. Allen implied that judges should
look beyond the mere fact of agency involvement in drafting to other types of agency legislative history to make
sure that no other evidence pointed to a disagreement between Congress and the responsible agency. 396 U.S.
168, 181–82, 184, 188 (1969).
59
818 F.2d 953, 960–61 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (“It is well established that the prestige of a statutory
construction by an agency depends crucially upon whether it was promulgated contemporaneously with
enactment of the statute.”).
60
818 F.2d 1148, 1155–56 n.4 (5th Cir. 1987); see also Aluminum Co. of Am. v. Cent. Lincoln Peoples’
Util. Dist., 467 U.S. 380, 390 (1984) (noting that the agency was involved in drafting the statute and its
interpretation came immediately following the enactment of the statute); Howe v. Smith, 452 U.S. 473, 474
(1981) (noting that the agency’s interpretation was “contemporaneous”).
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Agencies engage in various types of formal communications with Congress to
express opinions about legislation, to raise issues with legislation, and to suggest
changes to legislation. This section discusses various types of legislative
analysis that agencies provide to Congress. The types of agency legislative
history discussed here are not mutually exclusive, and often various types will
exist for any bill.
1. Section-by-Section Analyses
When agencies propose their own legislation to Congress, they often include
a section-by-section analysis that explains the legislation in relatively plainlanguage terms and provides color and context to the statutory language.61 This
is similar to congressional committee reports, which normally contain a similar
section-by-section analysis of legislation.62 An agency-drafted section-bysection analysis can be important to understanding how Congress perceived the
agency’s proposed legislative language. It is now known that many members of
Congress and their staff are more likely to read committee reports than
legislative language.63 It may also be true that these same legislators and staff
read an agency’s plain-language section-by-section analysis more closely than
an agency’s proposed statutory text, which can be difficult to decipher because
it often amends various portions of existing law and cross-references other
statutory provisions. These section-by-section analyses therefore may be the
best evidence of what Congress believes it is enacting when it adopts agencydrafted legislation.64

61
For examples of agency section-by-section analyses, see OLC Detailed Guidelines for Preparation of
Legislative Proposals for the Fiscal Year 2016 DoD Legislative Program, DEP’T OF DEF. (2014), http://ogc.osd.
mil/olc/docs/DetailedGuidelinesforPreparingProposalsFY16.pdf (discussing section-by-section analysis
requirement for DoD proposals); Surface Transportation Reauthorization Bill, U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP. (Feb. 11,
2015), https://www.transportation.gov/content/surface-transportation-reauthorization-bill-laying-foundationus-economic-growth-and-job (providing proposed legislative language and accompanying section-by-section
analysis to Congress).
62
ESKRIDGE, JR., INTERPRETING LAW, supra note 21, at 242.
63
Archer-Daniels-Midland Co. v. United States, 37 F.3d 321, 323–24 (7th Cir. 1994) (Posner, C.J.). That
members of Congress are more likely to read a committee report than actual statutory language is confirmed by
some of those involved in the legislative process. See Gluck & Bressman, Part I, supra note 1, at 968–69. Judge
Katzmann recently explained, in light of “the expanding, competing demands on legislators’ time,” “they cannot
read every word of the bills they vote upon, but they, and certainly their staffs, become educated about the bill
by reading the materials produced by the committees and conference committees from which the proposed
legislation emanates.” Robert A. Katzmann, Statutes, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 637, 653 (2012).
64
See Lisa Schultz Bressman, Chevron’s Mistake, 58 DUKE L.J. 549, 582 (2009) (“[A]n agency may be
involved in drafting the legislation, sharing its interpretations with legislative staff. If those understandings are
sufficiently specific, Congress may rely on them when enacting legislation.”).
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Various agencies make their legislative proposals and accompanying
section-by-section analyses publicly available. For example, the DoD’s Office
of Legislative Counsel posts its legislative proposals and section-by-section
analyses on its website.65 The DoD has a sophisticated and coordinated
legislative drafting process, due partially to the fact that Congress passes a yearly
defense reauthorization bill that requires significant input from the DoD.66 The
DoD proposes hundreds of pages of legislative language every year, and all of
this legislative language is accompanied by a relatively plain-language sectionby-section analysis of the purpose and function of the bill.67 It is likely that the
DoD creates these section-by-section analyses for a reason: it knows that
committee staff and members of Congress want a clear explanation of what the
proposals do, which is hard to provide through relatively technical and dense
legislative text.
2. Views Letters
Views letters are an additional type of agency legislative analysis. Views
letters are formal letters sent to Congress that state an agency’s position on
proposed legislation. These letters generally include a description of why the
agency supports or opposes the legislation and what the agency believes the
legislation will do.68 Sometimes an agency will also include technical comments
65
See, e.g., DoD Legislative Proposals, Fiscal Year 2017, DEP’T OF DEF., http://ogc.osd.mil/olc/
legispro17.html (last visited Oct. 20, 2018).
66
See, e.g., National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017, H.R. 4909, 114th Cong. §§ 113,
143 (2d Sess. 2016). The Farm Bill is an example of another must-pass bill that receives significant agency input.
See, e.g., Agriculture, Rural Development, Food and Drug Administration, and Related Agencies Appropriations
Act, H.R. 5054, 114th Cong. (2d Sess. 2016).
67
DoD Legislative Proposals, Fiscal Year 2018, DEP’T OF DEF., http://ogc.osd.mil/olc/legispro18.html
(last visited Oct. 20, 2018).
68
See, e.g., Morgan v. United States, No. CV 84-4664 (RR), 1991 WL 353371, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. June 30,
1991) (citing to a views letter from the Veterans Administration showing the agency’s position and interpretation
of what the amendment would do); see also DEP’T OF DEFENSE, OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL, supra note
40, at 4 (“Periodically, the Chairman of the House or Senate Armed Services Committee requests that DoD
review a bill and provide an official position, or ‘views’ of the Department via a formal letter on the merits of
the subject bill. Such a letter declaring DoD’s official position, or ‘views,’ is commonly referred to as a ‘Views
Letter.’ OLC receives the requests for Departmental views letters and coordinates them with all concerned DoD
components.”); NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., Congressional Testimony and Views Letters, OFF. OF
LEGIS. & INTERGOVERNMENTAL AFF., http://www.legislative.noaa.gov/115testimony.html (last visited Oct. 20,
2018) (“Views letters are statements of the Agency’s, Department’s, and Administration’s position, thoughts,
and comments, on specific issues or legislation being considered by Congress.”); Views Letters, U.S. DEP’T OF
JUST., OFF. OF LEGIS. AFF., https://www.justice.gov/ola/views-letters (last visited Oct. 20, 2018); Letters to
Congress, DEP’T OF COM., OFF. OF THE GEN. COUNS., https://ogc.commerce.gov/letters (last visited Oct. 20,
2018); Copies of Certain Department of Justice (DOJ) Views Letters from the 109th and 110th Congresses,
2005–2007, GOVERNMENTATTIC.ORG (NOV. 14, 2014), http://www.governmentattic.org/13docs/
DOJviewsLetters_2005-2007.pdf (compiling Department of Justice views letters through FOIA requests).
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as part of a views letter.69 For major pieces of legislation, an agency may send
multiple views letters throughout the legislative process as the legislation
evolves. Views letters sometimes provide direct insight into the meaning of
statutory language.70 Even when they do not provide insight into specific
language, they are helpful to establish what an agency has told Congress it
believes the purpose and scope of the legislation is and to contextualize the
relationship between the agency and Congress.71
3. Pre-Drafting Reports and Memos
Agencies also often send reports, letters, and memos to Congress early in the
legislative process as Congress is contemplating legislation. Because these types
of communications come before legislation is drafted, they can take a variety of
forms and are often speculative and preliminary in nature. These
communications are often focused on describing an issue that requires a
legislative solution, so that Congress is aware of it, rather than attempting to
resolve the issue. To the extent these communications propose resolutions, they
often describe various potential solutions and explain the pros and cons of each
without getting to the level of technical legislative language.72
Because these types of communications tend to be relatively broad and are
often sent to Congress long before legislation is drafted, they will usually be less
useful than other types of agency legislative history and are very unlikely to be
dispositive. To the extent they are useful, it will generally be as background to

69
See Negonsott v. Samuels, 507 U.S. 99, 106 (1993) (noting that the Department of Interior proposed
amendments to the original bill in a letter to Congress).
70
See supra note 68.
71
See supra note 68.
72
For example, the America Invents Act (AIA) was enacted after many years of negotiation between the
United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) and various congressional committees. The USPTO
prepared an early version of the legislation, then proceeded to send at least six views letters and various reports
to congressional committees in the following years. Letter from Gary Locke to the Honorable Patrick J. Leahy,
Chairman, Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, and the Honorable Jeff Sessions, Ranking Member, Senate Comm.
on the Judiciary (Apr. 20, 2010) (on file with U.S. Dep’t of Commerce) (stating that the new post-grant review
procedures “will serve as a faster, lower-cost alternative to litigation.”); Letter from John J. Sullivan to the
Honorable Patrick J. Leahy, Chairman, Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, and the Honorable Arlen Specter,
Ranking Member, Senate Comm. on the Judiciary (May 18, 2007) (on file with U.S. Dep’t of Commerce); Letter
from Nathaniel F. Wienecke to the Honorable Patrick J. Leahy, Chairman, Senate Comm. on the Judiciary 4
(Feb. 4, 2008) (on file with U.S. Dep’t of Commerce) (“The Administration supports establishment of an
effective, efficient post-grant patent review process that truly functions as a lower-cost alternative to litigation
. . . .”). This bill was subject to much litigation, including a case that reached the Supreme Court very recently,
Cuozzo Speed Technologies, LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131 (2016), but the Court made no mention of this agency
legislative history.
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uncover the agency–Congress relationship and why Congress chose to legislate
in the manner it did.
4. Agency Testimony
Another way in which agencies participate in the legislative process is
through testimony in congressional hearings.73 Congress regularly invites
agencies to testify about particular issues or proposed legislation. This testimony
is drafted within an agency the same way a legislative proposal would be: the
relevant bureau creates a draft and then that draft goes through an internal
agency clearance process and OMB clearance before it is submitted to
Congress.74 This testimony is therefore meant to reflect official administration
policy.
Scholars and judges already consider congressional hearings to be a type of
legislative history, since hearings are almost always publicly available.75
However, scholars have not emphasized the importance of agency testimony.76
Because agencies are closely involved in drafting and revising legislation, their
testimony is likely to be informative and accurate in explaining how legislation
is intended to work. It is also very likely that committee members form their
opinions on legislation based on how it is described by agencies and rely on
representations made by agencies of how legislation will be carried out after
enactment.

73
Agencies generally post this testimony on their websites. See, e.g., Congressional Testimony, U.S.
DEP’T OF JUST., OFF. OF LEGIS. AFF., https://www.justice.gov/ola/congressional-testimony (last visited Oct. 20,
2018); Congressional Testimony, U.S. DEP’T OF LAB., http://www.dol.gov/newsroom/congress (last visited Oct.
20, 2018); Congressional Testimony, U.S. DEP’T OF ST., BUREAU OF LEGIS. AFF., https://www.state.gov/s/h/tst/
(last visited Oct. 20, 2018); Testimony, DEP’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY, https://www.dhs.gov/newsreleases/testimony (last visited Oct. 20, 2018); Testimony, U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., OFF. OF INSPECTOR GEN.,
https://www.oig.dot.gov/testimony (last visited Oct. 20, 2018).
74
See DEP’T OF DEF., OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL, supra note 40, at 5 (“Congress frequently invites
DoD leaders to testify before various committees and subcommittees. Because the subject of the testimony often
crosses jurisdictional boundaries with other DoD components and government agencies, once again extensive
coordination is required to ensure that DoD, and ultimately the entire Administration, speak with one voice.”).
75
For example, the Government Publishing Office maintains a record of hearings for each House and
Senate Committee. See Browse by Committee, GOVINFO, https://www.govinfo.gov/browse/committee (last
visited Oct. 20, 2018) (listing each House and Senate committee with links to congressional hearings for each
committee).
76
Patricia M. Wald, Some Observations on the Use of Legislative History in the 1981 Supreme Court
Term, 68 IOWA L. REV. 195, 202 (1983) (“The hornbook rule that hearings are relevant only as background to
show the purpose of the statute no longer holds. In many cases the best explanation of what the legislation is
about comes from the executive department or outside witnesses at the hearings.”).
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5. Courts’ Use of Agency Legislative Analysis
Courts, mostly in the pre-Chevron era, have occasionally considered the
various types of legislative analyses described above. For example, in United
States v. Vogel Fertilizer Co., the Supreme Court looked to a “General
Explanation” accompanying a bill proposed by the Department of Treasury.77
This document is similar to a section-by-section analysis in that it was drafted
by the Department to explain the purpose and operation of specific legislative
provisions in the agency’s proposal. Congress enacted the legislative language
proposed by the Department of Treasury, and a few years later the Department
promulgated implementing regulations.78 The Court looked to the written
explanations provided by the Department to Congress with the proposed
legislation and determined that they were “wholly incompatible” with the
agency’s interpretation in the regulation.79 This position was bolstered by the
fact that the House Committee Report adopted language similar to the Treasury
Department’s explanations.80
Other courts have also considered these types of agency legislative analyses.
In Watkins v. Blinzinger, Judge Easterbrook, a noted textualist, approached the
question of whether personal injury awards are income for purposes of
determining whether a family qualified for the Aid to Families with Dependent
Children program.81 The language at issue in the case was drafted by the
Department of Health and Human Services, which was charged with carrying
out the program.82 As part of his analysis, Judge Easterbrook looked to a sectionby-section analysis the agency provided to Congress—which the House
committee also appended to its report—and to a summary of the draft bill that
the Department provided with the legislative proposal.83 Although these
documents were not dispositive, Judge Easterbrook used the section-by-section
analysis to support his ruling in favor of the agency by showing that the agency’s
interpretation was in line with the stated purpose of the bill.84
Courts have occasionally referenced agency views letters, generally where
these letters were included in a congressional committee report. In United States
v. One Bell Jet Ranger II Helicopter, a case over the potential forfeiture of a
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84

455 U.S. 16, 29 (1982).
Id. at 28.
Id. at 31–32.
Id. at 32.
789 F.2d 474, 475 (7th Cir. 1986).
Id. at 475 n.2.
Id. at 479–80.
Id. at 480.
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helicopter used to hunt big horn sheep, the Ninth Circuit considered whether the
forfeiture provision of the Airborne Hunting Act was subject to judicial
discretion or agency discretion.85 The Department of Interior claimed that under
the statute it was up to the agency whether to seize the helicopter.86 The lower
court ruled that it was in the court’s discretion and decided that forfeiture was
not warranted.87 To resolve the question the Ninth Circuit noted that the statutory
language was proposed by the Department of Interior and looked to a views
letter written by the Assistant Secretary of the Interior, which was included in
the Senate report of the bill.88 The views letter advised the Senate that the
language was intended “to confer upon the courts discretion to determine
whether or not forfeiture of animals taken or equipment used in violation of the
Act is appropriate in a particular case.”89 The court noted the historic Supreme
Court practice of granting deference where Congress enacts legislation proposed
by an agency, but ruled against the agency’s interpretation in this case, instead
relying on “the statement made to Congress by the agency at the very time it
presented its own amendment to the Congress as one it urged for adoption, as
the more reliable.”90
In another case, United States v. Sotelo, the Supreme Court considered
whether statutory language should allow liability for taxes withheld on behalf of
a third party to be dischargeable in bankruptcy.91 The Court looked to two views
letters sent from the Assistant Secretary of the Treasury to the House and Senate
Judiciary Committees, and included in the House committee report,92 expressing
Treasury’s position that “any discharge of liability for collected withholding
taxes was undesirable.”93 The House committee noted that legislation was
amended to eliminate Treasury’s opposition.94 The legislation, however, was not
entirely clear, and the taxpayer argued that his withholding tax liability should
be discharged.95 The Court relied on the views letters to show that Congress had

85

943 F.2d 1121, 1126 (9th Cir. 1991).
Id.
87
Id. at 1122.
88
Id. at 1126 (citing S. REP. NO. 92-1157 (1972), as reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3835, 3839).
89
Id.
90
Id.
91
436 U.S. 268, 270 (1978).
92
Id. at 276.
93
Id.
94
Id. at 276–77 (explaining that the amendment was created “to meet the objection of Treasury to the
discharge of so-called trust fund taxes”).
95
Id. at 272.
86
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intended to ameliorate Treasury’s concern and to conclude that the liability at
issue was not dischargeable in bankruptcy.96
Similarly, in Lindahl v. Office of Personnel Management,97 the Court
considered both agency testimony and views letters in deciding in favor of the
agency’s interpretation. Congress had proposed a bill that would grant broad
judicial review to determinations made by the Office of Personnel
Management.98 The Court noted that in committee hearings on the proposed bill,
OPM testified in opposition to the bill as written, and in response, the committee
amended the statute to limit the scope of judicial review.99 The Director of OPM
then sent both the House and Senate committees a views letter expressing
support for the bill as amended, and these letters were included in the House and
Senate committee reports.100 The Court relied on these statements to determine
that Congress intended to restrict the scope of judicial review of OPM’s
determinations.101
The Court has also considered letters sent from agencies to Congress in the
pre-drafting stages of legislation, although less frequently than other types of
agency legislative history and only where the pre-drafting documents turned out
to be relevant to the legislative process. For example, in Thompson v.
Thompson,102 the Justice Department, knowing that Congress was
contemplating drafting legislation, sent a letter outlining a variety of legislative
options to deal with parental kidnapping. This letter was referred to extensively
in the congressional debates over the legislation, which is probably why the
Court viewed it as reliable legislative history. The letter focused on two options:
either granting jurisdiction to federal courts to enforce state custody decrees or
imposing on states the duty to give full faith and credit to custody decrees of
other states.103 The agency’s letter discussed the pros and cons of each approach
and ultimately argued in favor of leaving states to enforce custody decrees and

96

Id. at 277.
470 U.S. 768, 784–85 (1985).
98
Id. at 780.
99
Id. at 784 (“Thereafter, the full Committee adopted an amendment in the nature of a substitute to H.R.
2510 that limited full judicial review ‘to cases involving agency-filed applications for disability retirement based
on an employee’s mental condition.’”).
100
Id. at 784–85 (citing Letter from Alan K. Campbell, Dir., OPM, to Representative James M. Hanley,
Chairman, House Comm. on Post Office and Civil Service (May 14, 1980), reprinted in H.R. REP. NO. 96-1080,
at 2 (1980); Letter from Alan K. Campbell, Dir., OPM, to Senator Abraham A. Ribicoff, Chairman, Senate
Comm. on Governmental Affairs (Sept. 25, 1980), reprinted in S. REP. NO. 96-1004, at 4–5 (1980).
101
Id. at 785.
102
484 U.S. 174, 185 (1988).
103
Id.
97
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against the federal approach.104 Although the enacted legislation did not
preclude a federal cause of action, the Court relied on this letter to infer that
Congress did not intend to allow a federal cause of action.105
Agency legislative analysis also commonly occurs during agency testimony
in congressional hearings. Because this testimony is recorded in the
Congressional Record and therefore always publicly available, courts have
unsurprisingly cited to it frequently, most commonly when the agency was also
involved in drafting the legislation.106 Like other types of agency legislative
history, the Court relied on agency testimony most commonly in the preChevron era. For example, in Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill,107 the famous
snail darter case, the Supreme Court looked to testimony by various officials
from the Department of Interior to support its broad reading of protections for
endangered species under the Endangered Species Act.108 Similarly, in Zuber v.
Allen, the Supreme Court stated that it gives greater deference to an agency
interpretation where the agency participated in the drafting and “directly made
known their views to Congress in committee hearings.”109 In NLRB v. Servette,
Inc.,110 the Supreme Court considered whether a certain action by union workers
was an “unfair labor practice.” The question was whether amendments to labor
law that the Department of Labor proposed encompassed the union’s actions.111
The Court noted that the provisions came from the agency and looked at
testimony by the Secretary of Labor to confirm that the agency’s interpretation
was within the intended scope of the legislative changes.112

104

Id.
Id. at 185–86.
106
For examples other than those discussed in the text here, see Wright v. City of Roanoke Redev. &
Hous. Auth., 479 U.S. 418, 425 n.7 (1987); Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. R.A. Gray & Co., 467 U.S. 717, 722
n.2 (1984); Monroe v. Standard Oil Co., 452 U.S. 549, 558 (1981) (“The legislation was proposed by the
Department of Labor. Accordingly, the testimony [of agency staff] . . . is instructive.”); Dawson Chem. Co. v.
Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176, 204 (1980) (relying on DOJ testimony as evidence that the legislature intended
to expand patentee protection under Section 271(d) of the Patent Act); Friedsam v. Nicholson, 19 Vet. App. 222,
225–26 (2005) (reviewing agency testimony and determining that it was relevant to the case).
107
437 U.S. 153, 179–80 (1978).
108
Id. (“These provisions were designed, in the words of an administration witness, ‘for the first time [to]
prohibit [a] federal agency from taking action which does jeopardize the status of endangered species,’ . . . .
[T]he proposed bills would ‘[direct] all . . . Federal agencies to utilize their authorities for carrying out programs
for the protection of endangered animals.’”).
109
396 U.S. 168, 192 (1969).
110
377 U.S. 46, 48–49 (1964).
111
Id. at 51.
112
Id. at 52 n.8, 53 n.9.
105
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The Supreme Court has also used agency testimony to overturn agency
interpretations. In Piper v. Chris-Craft Industries, Inc.,113 the Court looked to
the testimony of the SEC Chairman during the legislative process to demonstrate
the purpose of the legislation. In that case, the SEC argued that the legislation
was intended to protect both tender offerors and shareholders.114 However, the
Court looked to statements made by the SEC Chairman at the time the bill was
being considered in Congress, which indicated that the legislation was targeted
solely at shareholders and not tender offerors.115 By looking to the agency
legislative history, the Court attempted to ensure that later political changes did
not upset the legislative bargain that led to enactment a number of years before.
In a case with similar reasoning, United States v. Giordano,116 the Court
considered a question of who had authority to approve wiretap applications. The
Attorney General argued in favor of a broad ability to delegate approval of
wiretaps, and argued specifically that authorization of a wiretap by the Attorney
General’s executive assistant was not inconsistent with the statute.117 The Court
looked to testimony by the Department of Justice (DOJ) to resolve the issue.118
Early versions of the bill granted the Attorney General broad authority to
delegate authorization of wiretaps, and at the time of the earlier bills the DOJ
had testified that the ability to delegate should be limited to only high-level
officials.119 Congress amended the bill to match the DOJ’s views.120 The
language was not immediately enacted but instead was included in later
legislative proposals until it ultimately passed a number of years later.121 The
Court relied on the earlier DOJ testimony to show that the bill was meant to
restrict who could authorize a wiretap to only high-level officials, and that the
authorization at issue in the case was therefore unlawful.122
E. Accessibility of Agency Legislative History
One of the main contributions of this Article is to point out just how common
agency legislative history is, yet how rarely it is referenced by judges and
scholars. One explanation for this is that agency legislative history is only
113
114
115
116
117
118
119
120
121
122

430 U.S. 1, 33 (1977).
Id.
Id. at 34–35.
416 U.S. 505, 507–08 (1974).
Id. at 512.
Id. at 516–17.
Id. at 516.
Id. at 520.
Id. at 517.
Id. at 520.
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sporadically available to the public. A number of agencies post at least some of
their legislative communications online.123 Others post none. And an
examination of various congressional committee reports reveals that Congress
sometimes incorporates many of the types of agency legislative history
described above into its own legislative history.124 In fact, in most of the cases
discussed in this Part, citations to agency legislative history are actually to
agency documents that Congress incorporated into its legislative history. This is
unsurprising in light of the relative inaccessibility of agency legislative history.
Most commonly, a congressional committee will include agency-produced
documents as part of a committee report. For example, Congress sometimes
incorporates an agency-drafted views letter into a committee report either in the
body of the report or as an appendix.125 Committee reports also sometimes
include reports from an agency or portions of agency testimony that are relevant
to the enacted language.126 In one case, the Supreme Court even noted that both
123

See supra Section II.E.
This is confirmed by agency staff who are involved in the legislative process. See Shobe, Agencies as
Legislators, supra note 5, at 491 n.156 (“[A]gencies offer section-by-section analysis of bills drafted in an
agency and supply other documents and studies to Congress, and respondents reported that these types of agencyproduced documents can end up in a committee or conference report.”). Interestingly, Congress has, on occasion,
incorporated agency legislative history into enacted statutory language. See, e.g., Medical Device User Fee and
Modernization Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-250, § 101(3), 116 Stat. 1588, 1589 (2002) (“[T]he fees authorized
by this title will be dedicated to meeting the goals identified in the letters from the Secretary of Health and
Human Services to the Committee on Energy and Commerce of the House of Representatives and the Committee
on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions of the Senate, as set forth in the Congressional Record.”); Food and
Drug Administration Modernization Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-115, § 101(4) , 111 Stat. 2296, 2298 (1997)
(“[T]he fees authorized by amendments made in this subtitle will be dedicated toward expediting the drug
development process and the review of human drug applications as set forth in the goals identified, for purposes
of part 2 of subchapter C of chapter VII of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, in the letters from the
Secretary of Health and Human Services to the chairman of the Committee on Commerce of the House of
Representatives and the chairman of the Committee on Labor and Human Resources of the Senate, as set forth
in the Congressional Record.”).
125
See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 112-98, at 85–88 (2011) (incorporating a views letter from the Department of
Commerce); S. REP. NO. 110-143, at 17–23 (2007) (including both excerpts from a statement of Under Secretary
for Benefits of the Department of Veterans Affairs and a letter from the Secretary of the Department of Veterans
Affairs); S. REP. NO. 108-264, at 28–29 (2004) (including a letter from Director of Office of Congressional and
Legislative Affairs of Dept. of Interior); S. REP. NO. 106-325, at 5–9 (2000) (including a letter from Henry H.
Shelton, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and William S. Cohen, Secretary of Defense); S. REP. NO. 105207, at 14–17 (1998) (including two letters from Kevin Gover, Assistant Secretary–Indian Affairs); H.R. Rep.
No. 99-660, at 63–67 (1986) (including letters from John R. Bolton, Assistant Attorney General, United States
Department of Justice).
126
See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 114-396, at 13–14 (2016) (“[T]he Department of Homeland Security Inspector
General recently released a report entitled ‘TSA Can Improve Aviation Worker Vetting’ . . . . The report made
six recommendations to strengthen the vetting of credentialed aviation workers. This legislation codifies several
of those recommendations and ensures that TSA has access to the necessary data to properly vet aviation
employees, strengthen its criminal background check capabilities, and better-resolve issues of lawful status for
credential applicants.”); S. REP. NO. 105-20, at 8–12 (1997) (including testimony from Gary Niles Kimble,
124
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the House and Senate committee reports consisted “almost entirely of a letter
and memorandum from Acting Secretary of the Interior,” and relied heavily on
the committee reports in its interpretation.127 Sometimes the committee report
will also describe interactions with the agency and suggestions from the agency
that Congress chose to adopt or reject.128
While it is often clear when Congress has chosen to incorporate agency
legislative history, other times Congress adopts agency legislative history as its
own without attribution. For example, as discussed above, the DoD makes
annual legislative proposals to Congress and posts these proposals and a sectionby-section analysis to its website.129 This makes it possible to compare the
section-by-section analyses drafted by the DoD with the committee report
produced by Congress. The author undertook a comparison of many of these
documents, which revealed that language included in both Senate and House
reports is often taken verbatim from the sectional analysis provided by the DoD,
without attribution.130 Other comparisons of agency comments and
congressional legislative history reveal that Congress is likely heavily
influenced by agencies when creating legislative history, even if that influence

Commissioner, Administration for Native Americans, Administration for Children and Families–U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services); NAACP v. Detroit Police Officers Ass’n, 900 F.2d 903, 909 (6th
Cir. 1990) (considering a statement from the Justice Department that had been placed in the Congressional
Record); Krinsk v. Fund Asset Mgmt., Inc., No. 85 Civ. 8428 (JMW), 1986 WL 205, at *4 n.6 (S.D.N.Y. 1986)
(citing to a memo drafted by the SEC and included in the House committee report).
127
Negonsott v. Samuels, 507 U.S. 99, 106–09 (1993).
128
See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 114-107, pt. 1, at 245 (2015) (“We even received a letter from the widely
respected Secretary of Energy. This may well be the first time in the history of this Committee that a sitting
Cabinet member has provided formal opposition to a piece of legislation that we are considering, certainly at
this stage of the legislative process. That should be a strong indication of just how bad this bill really is.”); H.R.
REP. NO. 111-97, at 4 (2009) (“Following the hearings, the legislation was refined to take into account concerns
raised by the Department of Justice and potential defendants, and the False Claims Amendments Act of 1986
was enacted on October 27, 1986.”); S. REP. NO. 105-379, at 10 (1998) (“At the hearing held on July 8, 1998,
the Department of the Interior testified that it could not support S. 391 unless section 9(d) (Affirmative Defenses
Waived) was removed.”); Am. Tobacco Co. v. Patterson, 456 U.S. 63, 73 (1982) (noting that a Justice
Department statement was placed in the Congressional Record by one of the bill’s sponsors); Int’l Bhd. of
Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 351 (1977) (same); Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747,
759–60 (1976) (same).
129
See supra note 65.
130
Compare DEP’T OF DEF., 2008 SECTION-BY-SECTION ANALYSIS 10, 16 (2008), http://ogc.osd.mil/
olc/docs/26April2013NDAASectionalAnalysis.pdf, with S. REP. NO. 110-77, at 398–99 (2008); compare DEP’T
OF DEF., 2013 SECTION-BY-SECTION ANALYSIS 27 (2013), http://ogc.osd.mil/olc/docs/26April2013NDAA
SectionalAnalysis.pdf, with S. REP. NO. 112-173, at 103 (2012); compare DEP’T OF DEF., 2014 SECTION-BYSECTION ANALYSIS 14, 68, 136 (2014), http://ogc.osd.mil/olc/docs/26April2013NDAASectionalAnalysis.pdf,
with H.R. REP. NO. 113-102, at 173–74, 187, 362 (2014); compare DEP’T OF DEF., 2016 SECTION-BY-SECTION
ANALYSIS 141 (2016), http://ogc.osd.mil/olc/docs/26April2013NDAASectionalAnalysis.pdf, with S. REP. NO.
114-49, at 178 (2016).
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is not clearly acknowledged in Congress’s legislative history.131 Of course, it is
impossible to tell exactly how common this is without access to all agency
legislative history.
To increase accessibility, litigants could try to request agency legislative
documents through FOIA, but they would have to know what to ask for and
agencies may not keep good track of documents, especially older ones.132 Were
courts to begin to rely on agency legislative history more generally, access could
become an even bigger issue. Because agencies have access to their own
documents but the public does not, they could use agency legislative history
strategically in litigation to support their positions, and leave it out when it hurts
their positions. If courts are going to rely on agency legislative history, then it
needs to be available to those who wish to challenge agency interpretations, not
just agencies wishing to defend their interpretations. As it stands now, if courts
were to rely on all agency legislative history, whether or not Congress adopts it,
agencies would be able to use their privileged position to cherry-pick helpful
agency legislative history and suppress unhelpful agency legislative history. It
could also allow agencies to fill the agency legislative history with language that
does not reflect the legislative deal, and that was never approved by Congress,
so that they could reference it in the future to support their interpretation.133

131
For example, in the America Invents Act, the USPTO was especially influential in drafting and revising
various versions of the bill. The USPTO sent a number of views letters to the relevant committees and these
views letters used language very similar to language that ended up in the congressional committee reports about
the purpose and function of the post-grant review proceedings that were an important part of the AIA. Compare
Letter from Gary Locke to the Honorable Patrick J. Leahy, Chairman, Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, and the
Honorable Jeff Sessions, Ranking Member, Senate Comm. On the Judiciary, supra note 72, and Letter from
Nathaniel F. Wienecke to the Honorable Patrick J. Leahy, Chairman, Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, supra note
72, with Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2143 (2016) (“Inter partes review is a ‘quick and
cost effective alternativ[e] to litigation.”) (citing to the House Committee Report), and id. (“Inter partes review
is ‘a quick, inexpensive, and reliable alternative to district court litigation”) (citing S. REP. NO. 110-259, at 20
(2008)). The House Committee Report for the AIA included a views letter from the Department of Commerce.
See H.R. REP. NO. 112-98, at 85–88 (2011).
132
The website governmentattic.org has posted certain DOJ views letters acquired through FOIA requests
on its website. See, e.g., Copies of Certain Views Letters, 2001-2005, supra note 38. As part of this project the
author made a number of FOIA requests for agency legislative history and while some agencies were able to
provide the relevant documents, other agencies were unable to find them, especially those created many years
ago. Requiring litigants to use FOIA requests to uncover agency legislative history is an imperfect solution to
the access problem.
133
One solution to level the playing field would be to make the types of formal agency legislative history
discussed here available in easily searchable online sources like the U.S. Code Congressional and Administrative
News, although this would obviously be a costly and burdensome project. Precedent exists for this type of
project. The Reagan Administration did this with presidential signing statements when it entered into an
agreement with West Publishing Company to publish these statements. Marc N. Garber & Kurt A. Wimmer,
Presidential Signing Statements as Interpretations of Legislative Intent: An Executive Aggrandizement of Power,
24 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 363, 367 (1987) (citing Att’y Gen. Edwin Meese III, Address to the National Press Club,
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The best solution to this accessibility problem would be for courts to
consider only agency legislative history that Congress incorporates into its own
legislative history, either in a congressional document like a committee report
or through other recorded communications that end up in the Congressional
Record. By consulting only agency legislative history that shows up in
Congress’s legislative history, courts could shape Congress’s generation of
legislative history by putting it on notice that courts will consider materials
incorporated into Congress’s legislative history, but only those materials.134 This
would put the burden on Congress to ensure that only agency legislative history
that accurately reflects the legislative deal is considered by courts, while also
reducing the litigation costs associated with finding and parsing all of the agency
legislative history. It would also reduce the incentive of agencies to generate
agency legislative history to influence judges rather than communicate honestly
with Congress.135 For example, Congress could insert an exact copy of a views
letter it receives from an agency in committee reports, could note in the
Congressional Record when it introduces a bill that was drafted by an agency,
could note where a section-by-section analysis in a committee report came from
an agency, and could even describe any disagreements with the agency in the
Congressional Record. As discussed above, Congress has done this in the past,136
but not as frequently and explicitly as it could.
Including more agency legislative history in congressional legislative history
would require more work from Congress, although the benefits to Congress
appear to justify the costs.137 It would not require Congress to draft more
Washington, D.C. (Feb. 25, 1986)) (“[W]e have now arranged with the West Publishing Company that the
presidential statement on the signing of a bill will accompany the legislative history from Congress so that all
can be available to the court for future construction of what the statute really means.”). However, this would not
necessarily address the concerns raised here, because it would still allow agencies to fill the legislative record
with their preferred interpretations without congressional oversight.
134
See Abbe R. Gluck et al., Unorthodox Lawmaking, Unorthodox Rulemaking, 115 COLUM. L. REV.
1789, 1857–58 (2015) (“[M]any of the Court’s interpretive rules aim to improve how Congress drafts. . . .
Textualists have long argued that one salutary effect of a text-centric approach is that it teaches Congress to draft
better the next time.”). Of course, there is a debate over whether courts should be trying to shape congressional
behavior at all, or merely reflect it. See id. at 1835–36.
135
Critics of legislative history have argued that the more legislative history is used, the less reliable it
becomes, and this same argument could be leveled against agency legislative history. Blanchard v. Bergeron,
489 U.S. 87, 98–99 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); see also Int’l Bhd. of
Elec. Workers, Local Union No. 474 v. NLRB, 814 F.2d 697, 717 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (Buckley, J., concurring)
(arguing that the use of legislative history by courts creates an incentive “to salt the legislative record with
unilateral interpretations of statutory provisions they were unable to persuade their colleagues to accept”).
136
See infra Part III (discussing courts’ use of agency legislative history, including instances where the
agency legislative history is included in congressional legislative history).
137
It could be that members of Congress or their staff want to take credit for drafting the legislative history
because of some kind of prestige or status benefits associated with being the drafter. It seems that this benefit
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legislative history, but simply to include the agency legislative history that it
considers to be reliable and authoritative in its own legislative history. The
benefit to Congress would be twofold: First is that it would memorialize agency–
Congress deals in a way that is easily accessible and salient to agencies, which
would make congressional legislative history more valuable to future
administrators attempting to implement statutory language. Second is that it
would allow Congress to make it clear to courts where they have relied on
agency–legislative communications so that courts could hold agencies
accountable for these communications in future implementation. To the extent
Congress is concerned about the expanding power of the administrative state,
this would constrain agency interpretations in ways that would more closely
align with the enacting Congress’s intent.
III. IMPLICATIONS OF AGENCY LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
Agency legislative history has implications for the ongoing debates about
agency deference and modes of statutory interpretation. Arguments about
deference are often empirical in nature, and this Part argues that agency
legislative history can help uncover the empirical realties of agency–Congress
interactions in the legislative process. Similarly, arguments about interpretation
often have an empirical component, and agency legislative history provides new
empirical background that could be relevant to how judges approach
interpretation. This Part considers these implications.
A. Implications for Deference
This section discusses the implications the under-explored world of agency
legislative history could have for important debates surrounding agency
delegation theory and practice. A number of scholars and judges have advocated
for a broad conception of Chevron that allocates interpretive authority to
agencies instead of the judicial branch.138 These arguments are often based on
agencies’ expertise and relative institutional competence.139 Agency legislative
history lends support to these arguments by showing that agencies are closely
involved in the legislative process and that the pool of materials judges would
need to obtain and understand is larger than typically thought. It also appears
that concerns surrounding deference expressed by some scholars and judges may
would be outweighed by the benefits described here to Congress from memorializing agency–Congress
legislative deals.
138
VERMEULE, supra note 12, at 206; Eskridge, Jr., supra note 10; Mashaw, supra note 10, at 93–95;
Spence & Cross, supra note 10, at 138–41.
139
See supra note 138.
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be overstated in light of the legislative relationships between Congress and
agencies.
It seems unlikely, however, that courts will be willing to entirely defer to
agencies. The passing of Justice Scalia, who was the Court’s strongest proponent
of broad Chevron deference,140 and the recent confirmation of Justice Gorsuch,
who often appeared to be a Chevron skeptic as a circuit court judge, makes it
more likely that the Court will look for ways to limit Chevron.141 Judges and
scholars have engaged in seemingly endless debates about when Chevron-style
deference should apply without reaching any consensus.142 For judges who are
skeptical of broad deference to agencies and are looking to return to a preChevron approach to deference that is more contextual, agency legislative
history will often provide useful background that would allow courts to defer on
a case-by-case basis in ways that are more likely to reflect congressional
intent.143 Indeed, as discussed in above, pre-Chevron courts often looked to
agency legislative history as a means of discerning whether to defer to an agency
interpretation, so in many ways this would simply be a return to prior judicial
practice. This section considers in more detail what agency legislative history
might mean for the many debates surrounding agency delegation.
1. Support for Deference
Arguments in support of a broad application of Chevron generally turn on
institutional arguments about courts’ ability to determine congressional intent to
defer. Those who support broad deference argue that bills are a series of complex
deals that go through various committees, internal logrolling, confidential
discussions, and negotiations with various lobbyists.144 They argue that it is
impossible for a court to reconstruct the legislative process to determine what
Congress would have done if it was presented with the issue in any particular
case, and that attempts to do so are costly.145 As Professor Vermeule has noted,

140

See infra notes 147–57 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., SAS Inst., Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348, 1358 (2018).
142
See infra Sections III.A.1.–III.A.3.
143
See supra Section II.D.
144
See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, The Role of Original Intent in Statutory Construction, 11 HARV. J.L.
& PUB. POL’Y 59, 64–65 (1998) (discussing complexities of the legislative process); Kenneth A. Shepsle &
Barry R. Weingast, The Institutional Foundations of Committee Power, 81 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 85, 89 (1987)
(same).
145
VERMEULE, supra note 12, at 190; Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes’ Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533,
548 (1983) (arguing that the many complexities of the legislative process are “so integral to the legislative
process that judicial predictions of how the legislature would have decided issues it did not in fact decide are
bound to be little more than wild guesses”).
141
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legislative history “contains an astonishing range of unusual material produced
in various ways by various actors.”146 Relatedly, Justice Scalia argued that
deference should not depend on determining any actual legislative intent to
defer, which he deemed a “wild-goose chase”147 that is merely “an invitation to
make an ad hoc judgment regarding congressional intent.”148 Even nontextualists agree that it is difficult or impossible for a court to determine whether
Congress would have wanted to defer in any particular instance.149 Agency
legislative history adds weight to these arguments by showing that the creation
of legislation is a multi-layered process that often turns on bargains necessary to
achieve enactment that would be impossible for a court to uncover.150
This Article’s findings indicate that there are even more documents a court
would need to find and understand to be able to accurately reconstruct the many
legislative deals that lead to enactment of a bill. For a generalist court to become
fully informed of the legislative process and purposes would require a level of
resources and expertise that may be beyond their capacity, especially for lower
courts with high caseloads. This complex, behind-the-scenes process, especially
as it relates to communications between agencies and Congress, is one that
courts may be more likely to disrupt than improve upon. Perhaps, in light of
agency legislative history, we should be even more skeptical of courts’ ability
to enter into the governmental “black box”151 and should instead fall back to a
more formalist approach that, while “fictional,” provides the best background
presumption against which Congress can legislate.152
Agency legislative history not only calls into question courts’ institutional
capacity to uncover congressional intent to delegate, but it also supports
arguments, first expressed by Professors Mashaw and Strauss, that agencies may
be better statutory interpreters than courts.153 Professors Walker and Sitaraman
found support for this idea in their discussions of agencies’ role in the legislative

146
147

VERMEULE, supra note 12, at 113.
Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989 DUKE. L.J. 511, 517

(1989).
148

City of Arlington v. FCC, 569 U.S. 290, 306 (2013).
See HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING
AND APPLICATION OF LAW 1183 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994); William N. Eskridge,
Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as Practical Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REV. 321, 348–49 (1990).
150
Easterbrook, supra note 145, at 547–48.
151
Pildes, supra note 13.
152
United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 240–45 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
153
See, e.g., VERMEULE, supra note 12; Mashaw, supra note 12 (“There are persuasive grounds for
believing that legitimate techniques and standards for agency statutory interpretation diverge sharply from the
legitimate techniques and standards for judicial statutory interpretation”); Sunstein & Vermeule, supra note 12.
149
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process.154 These arguments are based on the idea that agencies may have
internal understandings of what legislation means from their involvement in the
legislative process, something judges and scholars have long speculated.155 For
example, Justice Breyer said that “[t]he agency that enforces the statute may . .
. possess an internal history in the form of documents or ‘handed-down oral
tradition’ that casts light on the meaning of a difficult phrase or provision.”156
Justice Scalia similarly noted that agencies often have “intense familiarity with
the history and purposes of the legislation at issue.”157 Professor Vermeule
posited that “[a]gencies will often possess far better information about the
legislative process that produced the statute, about the specialized policy context
surrounding the statute’s enactment, and about the resulting legislative deal.”158
These arguments have always been based on speculation about the institutional
roles of agencies.
This Article shows that this speculation is indeed correct and that agencies
have their own rich legislative repositories of the types discussed here that record
and explain legislative deals and purposes. These documents are often
unavailable to courts and may be difficult for courts to understand and apply,
but they likely serve as a useful interpretive tool for those within agencies.
Agencies are able to use the institutional knowledge contained in agency
legislative history to recognize when congressional legislative history is
speaking to the agency, or even when congressional legislative history
incorporates agency–Congress legislative communications, in a way a court
could not. Agencies are therefore better able to separate reliable legislative
history from “cheap talk.”159 Agency legislative history provides support for the
154
Sitaraman, supra note 5, at 128 (“The executive’s role in legislative drafting provides additional
support to the Strauss-Mashaw thesis that agency interpretive practice can and should diverge from judicial
interpretive process.”); Walker, Legislating in the Shadows, supra note 5, at 1403 (arguing that the role of
agencies in the legislative process provides “additional empirical support for a more purposivist approach to
agency statutory interpretation”).
155
See infra notes 156–58.
156
Stephen Breyer, Judicial Review of Questions of Law and Policy, 38 ADMIN. L. REV. 363, 368 (1986);
see also Peter L. Strauss, When the Judge Is Not the Primary Official with Responsibility to Read: Agency
Interpretation and the Problem of Legislative History, 66 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 321, 329–30 (1990) [hereinafter
Strauss, When the Judge Is Not the Primary] (noting that agencies maintain “transcripts of relevant hearings,
correspondence, and other informal traces of the continuing interactions that go on between an agency and
Capitol Hill as a statute is being shaped in the legislative process . . . .”).
157
Scalia, supra note 147, at 514.
158
VERMEULE, supra note 12, at 209.
159
Daniel B. Rodriguez & Barry R. Weingast, The Positive Political Theory of Legislative History: New
Perspectives on the 1964 Civil Rights Act and Its Interpretation, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1417, 1445–46, 1448 (2003);
Strauss, When the Judge Is Not the Primary, supra note 156, at 347 (arguing that agencies are better able “to
distinguish reliably those considerations that served to shape the legislation, the legislative history wheat, from
the more manipulative chaff”).
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idea that agencies should be better interpreters than courts, and therefore that a
court would be better off deferring to agencies than attempting to insert itself
into something that it does not have the institutional competence to do well.
Agency legislative history also adds to the argument that Chevron is more
likely to reflect congressional intent, which is sometimes used to justify the
Chevron doctrine.160 Congressional staff have made it clear that they view
“Congress’s primary interpretive relationship as one with agencies, not with
courts.”161 Agency legislative history may provide documentation for why that
is: agencies and Congress are engaging in deep and complex legislative
communications throughout the legislative process. Agencies have direct lines
of communication with Congress in a way that courts do not, and the extent of
these communications are evidence of why agencies would be Congress’s
preferred interpreter.
2. Concerns with Deference
A number of Supreme Court Justices have expressed concern about the everexpanding powers of administrative agencies while questioning an unlimited
application of the Chevron doctrine.162 As Chief Justice Roberts said in his
dissent in City of Arlington v. FCC, “the danger posed by the growing power of
the administrative state cannot be dismissed.”163 Similar concerns have also been
raised by scholars and even some within Congress.164 These concerns are often
160

The clearest articulation of this at the Supreme Court is in Smiley v. Citibank (South Dakota), N.A.:
We accord deference to agencies under Chevron . . . because of a presumption that Congress, when it
left ambiguity in a statute meant for implementation by an agency, understood that the ambiguity would
be resolved . . . by the agency, and desired the agency (rather than the courts) to possess whatever degree
of discretion the ambiguity allows.

517 U.S. 735, 740–41 (1996).
161
Gluck and Bressman, Part II, supra note 5, at 765.
162
See, e.g., Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2712 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment)
(arguing that the EPA’s “request for deference raises serious questions about the constitutionality of our broader
practice of deferring to agency interpretations of federal statutes”); King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2488–89
(2015); Dep’t of Transp. v. Ass’n of Am. R.Rs., 135 S. Ct. 1225, 1254 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring)
(describing the administrative state as a system that “concentrates the power to make laws and the power to
enforce them in the hands of a vast and unaccountable administrative apparatus”). For an excellent discussion
of the rise of the administrative state, see Lawson, supra note 16.
163
City of Arlington v. FCC, 569 U.S. 290, 314–15 (2013).
164
See, e.g., Lisa Schultz Bressman, supra note 64 (arguing against automatic deference). The House
recently passed a bill aimed at regulatory agencies that directly repudiated Chevron. Separation of Powers
Restoration Act, H.R. 5, 115th Cong. § 202(1)(B) (2017) (“If the reviewing court determines that a statutory or
regulatory provision relevant to its decision contains a gap or ambiguity, the court shall not interpret that gap or
ambiguity as [1] an implicit delegation to the agency of legislative rulemaking authority . . . or [2] a justification
for interpreting agency authority expansively or for deferring to the agency’s interpretation on the question of
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constitutional in nature, based on understandings of separation of powers and a
fear of the rise of the administrative state in ways that could not have been
imagined by the Framers of the Constitution.165 Agency legislative history
cannot resolve this debate, although it does add context to it by showing that
Congress may be more sophisticated than judges and scholars give it credit for.
Congress has been able to manage and benefit from the rise of the administrative
state better than is typically acknowledged. Congress seeks out input from
various experts, agencies among them, and weighs options as it legislates.
Agency legislative history shows that Congress is capable of both accepting and
rejecting agency legislative requests and proposals based on its policy goals,
which provides evidence that Congress may not be as beholden to agencies as
some have feared.166 Agency legislative history also raises questions of whether
the Chief Justice’s concerns about the power of the administrative state are wellfounded. Judges and scholars who advocate for reduced deference often do so
under the guise of protecting Congress from an out-of-control administrative
state, but agency legislative history might cut back on that notion by showing
that Congress may be able to take care of itself, and that in any case courts may
be more likely to disturb an agency–Congress legislative bargain than improve
upon it.
Professors Walker and Sitaraman raise another concern about Chevron
deference in light of agency involvement in the legislative process. They have
argued that granting deference to agencies that are also involved in creating
legislation implicates similar concerns to those raised by Justice Scalia and
others with respect to Auer deference, which grants deference to agency
interpretations of their own regulations.167 Justice Scalia criticized Auer
deference because “deferring to an agency’s interpretation of its own rule
encourages the agency to enact vague rules which give it the power, in future

law.”). It is possible that broad judicial deference to agencies makes Congress less willing to pass legislation,
especially in times of divided government, because Congress cannot rely on courts to ensure agencies carry out
Congress’s will. If courts began to consider agency legislative history, then legislative gridlock might be, at least
somewhat, reduced.
165
See, e.g., Michigan, 135 S. Ct. at 2712 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment) (arguing that the
transfer of interpretive authority from courts to agencies “is in tension with Article III’s Vesting Clause, which
vests the judicial power exclusively in Article III courts, not administrative agencies”); Gutierrez-Brizuela v.
Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142, 1149 (10th Cir. 2016) (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (“[T]he fact is Chevron and Brand X
permit executive bureaucracies to swallow huge amounts of core judicial and legislative power and concentrate
federal power in a way that seems more than a little difficult to square with the Constitution of the framers’
design. Maybe the time has come to face the behemoth.”); PHILIP HAMBURGER, IS ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
UNLAWFUL? 315–17 (2014).
166
Walker, supra note 5, at 1419.
167
Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997).
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adjudications, to do what it pleases.”168 Following this line of reasoning,
Professor Walker argues that the fact that agencies are both involved in the
legislative drafting process and are charged with implementing statutes
potentially allows agencies to engage in self-dealing by drafting broad statutes
that delegate significant leeway to themselves.169 He argues that these concerns
with agency self-dealing arising from agency involvement in the legislative
process may be the “last straw” for Chevron and that the appropriate delegation
presumption going forward may be the less deferential Skidmore standard.170
Professor Walker’s analogy between Auer and Chevron certainly sounds
alarming. If agencies have usurped Congress’s legislative process and are both
primary creators and implementers of legislation, then a solution of less judicial
deference seems reasonable. However, Professor Walker’s study, and other
empirical studies to date, provide no evidence that Congress has ceded all, or
even a significant portion of, the creation of statutes to agencies.171 The agency
legislative history reviewed as part of this Article certainly does not indicate a
legislative process that is controlled by agencies. Congress requests technical
and substantive assistance from all kinds of interest groups, lobbyists, and
outside experts while creating legislation.172 Lobbyists and other outside experts
understand how legislation will work on the ground in much the same way
agencies do, since they represent those who must comply with legislation.173
These outside groups certainly help close the expertise gap between agencies
and Congress by reviewing agency drafting and alerting Congress to potential

168

Talk Am., Inc. v. Mich. Bell Tel. Co., 564 U.S. 50, 69 (2011) (Scalia, J., concurring).
Walker, supra note 5, at 1411 (“If the agency is indeed a partner with Congress in legislative drafting,
Justice Scalia’s concern about an agency legislating and executing the law should apply with some force to
legislative drafting. The executive and legislative functions are, in essence, combined via agency legislating in
the shadows.”).
170
Id. at 1380–81.
171
See, e.g., James J. Brudney, Essay, Contextualizing Shadow Conversations, 166 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE
37, 41–42 (2017) (recounting the author’s experience as a congressional staffer and that this experience did not
indicate that Congress ceded authority to agencies and instead indicated that “the congressional drafting process
is complex, messy, and far from uniform”); Gluck & Bressman, Part I, supra note 1, at 1000 (reporting “that
agencies often . . . participate in drafting and can be very useful partners,” but that congressional staff
“sometimes avoided the agency, particularly when they were aware of a conflicting position”).
172
Gluck & Bressman, Part II, supra note 5 (“[O]ur respondents told us that first drafts are typically
written by, respectively, the White House and agencies, or policy experts and outside groups, like lobbyists.
Empirical work is lacking for the details of this account . . . .”); see Kenneth W. Starr, Observations About the
Use of Legislative History, 1987 DUKE L.J. 371, 376 (“Lobbyists maneuver to get their clients’ opinions into the
mass of legislative materials . . . .”).
173
Victoria F. Nourse & Jane S. Schacter, The Politics of Legislative Drafting: A Congressional Case
Study, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 575, 611 (2002) (“Lobbyists are the closest to the people who will be affected by the
bill . . . .”).
169
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issues or potential overdelegations.174 This is not to understate the role of
agencies, which is deep and significant, but to point out that this Auer concern
understates the complexity of the legislative process. Congress, and the lobbyists
who work closely with Congress, are not naive, and it seems unlikely that they
have broadly ceded the legislative drafting process to agencies.
While a blanket presumption against delegation would be an overly broad
response to agency involvement in the legislative process, judges concerned
about agency self-dealing could use agency legislative history to determine
deference in more targeted ways. For example, sometimes agency legislative
history will reveal that an agency was hardly involved in creating the legislation
or that Congress rejected an agency’s legislative suggestions. It would seem odd
in those cases for a judge not to defer based on an Auer-type concern. Other
times the agency legislative history could reveal that Congress accepted a draft
of the legislation from an agency with few or no changes. In that case, perhaps
a judge would be justified in raising concerns about potential agency selfdealing. Agency legislative history would allow a judge with these concerns to
tailor deference to specific circumstances. This type of context-specific
approach to Chevron is discussed in more detail in the next section.
Interestingly, courts have never raised this Auer concern about agency
involvement in the legislative process even though, as discussed above, they
have considered agency involvement in drafting as a factor in deciding whether
to uphold an agency interpretation.175 Courts appear to take agency involvement
as a signal from Congress of an intent to defer to the agency rather than as raising
an issue of potential self-dealing. For example, the majority in Zuni Public
School District No. 89 v. Department of Education relied on the fact that an
agency was the original drafter of the language at issue as a sign that Congress
must have intended courts to defer to agency interpretations of the statute.176 The
Court did not explicitly say why, but it seems likely that the Court was less
concerned about agency self-dealing and more concerned about disrupting a
likely agency–Congress legislative understanding. Even when courts have
chosen not to defer when an agency was involved in the legislative process, they

174
Shobe, Intertemporal Statutory Interpretation, supra note 5, at 847–49. Spending on lobbyists has
increased significantly in recent years, so there is reason to believe they are taking an active role in policing
legislative language. Id. at 847 (“Recent reports show that spending on lobbying has more than doubled in the
last fifteen years, from $1.45 billion in 1998 to $3.3 billion in 2012. Long-serving committee staff and legislative
counsel anecdotally report that lobbyist involvement in the drafting process has increased significantly over the
last twenty years.”).
175
See supra Section II.B.
176
550 U.S. 81, 98, 107 (2007).
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have done so only because the interpretation was not close enough in time to the
enactment of the statute, while still noting that deference is generally due to
agencies that are involved in creating the statute at issue.177 In fact, the Court
has viewed lack of agency involvement in creating legislation as a reason not to
defer to an agency interpretation,178 which again emphasizes the Court’s view
that agency involvement should be viewed as favoring agency interpretations.
So it may be difficult to sell judges on the idea that agency involvement in
creating legislation should cause them to defer less rather than more.
Perhaps a better argument against deference in light of agency legislative
history than the Auer concern is that agency legislative history makes it clear
that agencies have the opportunity to influence legislative drafting before
enactment, so if they want Congress to enact policy they should use their
influence to do it legislatively. If an agency cannot get something in the
legislative text, the argument would be, then courts should not defer to that
agency and should instead conduct their own judicial review of the statutory
text. This would put agencies on notice that they need to resolve ambiguities
during the legislative process if they want to avoid judicial review and that if a
statute is ambiguous, a court will substantively review the agency’s work. This
argument seems to be the more appealing grounds for limiting Chevron
deference than concerns of agency self-dealing or collusion, although it would
impose significant costs on both courts and agencies and is unlikely to accurately
reflect congressional preferences.
3. Contextual Deference
Scholars have written volumes about when and how Chevron should apply,
and many have proposed other assumptions courts could apply in lieu of, or in
addition to, Chevron.179 In City of Arlington, Chief Justice Roberts looked to the
wording the Court used in Chevron to propose a case-by-case determination of
“whether Congress had ‘delegat[ed] authority to the agency to elucidate a
specific provision of the statute . . . .’”180 In the same case, Justice Breyer wrote
a concurrence that attempted to provide additional guidance on how this context177
See Barnett v. Weinberger, 818 F.2d 953, 960–61 (D.C. Cir. 1987); cases cited supra note 60 and
accompanying text.
178
See supra Section III.B. (discussing Nacirema Operating Co. v. Johnson, 396 U.S. 212 (1969)).
179
See Lisa Schultz Bressman, Essay, Reclaiming the Legal Fiction of Congressional Delegation, 97 VA.
L. REV. 2009, 2015, 2025 (2011) (demonstrating that a consensus exists in the academic literature that Chevron
is based on a fiction); Sitaraman, supra note 5, at 129; Strauss, “Chevron Space” and “Skidmore Weight”, supra
note 26, at 1145 (arguing that courts should use a case-by-case common law approach to determine when to give
deference); Walker, supra note 5, at 1409.
180
City of Arlington v. FCC, 569 U.S. 290, 318 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
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specific approach could work. Quoting Barnhart v. Walton, he listed a number
of factors the Court had already considered when deciding whether to defer,
including “the interstitial nature of the legal question, the related expertise of the
Agency, the importance of the question to administration of the statute, the
complexity of that administration, and the careful consideration the Agency has
given the question over a long period of time.”181 This echoes Justice Breyer’s
earlier writings in favor of a flexible approach to deference.182 The Court itself,
in Mead, left open the door for considering a wide range of factors by noting
that courts can look for “circumstances reasonably suggesting that Congress . . .
thought of [the agency interpretation] as deserving . . . deference.”183
Prominent scholars have also argued for a move toward a more contextspecific approach to delegation similar to that proposed by Justice Breyer.
Professor Strauss has argued for courts to engage in common law reasoning to
determine deference where Congress has not explicitly stated what kind of
deference it prefers courts to give.184 His preferred approach would be to allow
courts to allow for “case-by-case development of an imperfect statutory
framework to resolve a difficult issue of federal administrative law.”185
Professors Gluck and Bressman also expressed a desire for judges to maintain
an “umpireal” role for courts in deciding when to defer.186 Professor Walker
proposed an inquiry into whether “the ambiguity seems like a deliberate
delegation by the collective Congress, or whether it seems more like the result
of administrative collusion during the legislative process.”187 Despite all of these
judicial and scholarly attempts to figure out Chevron’s domain, we currently
have only a series of unweighted factors that are difficult to predict or apply in
any particular case, a series of assumptions that often do not reflect reality, and
vague descriptions of how to approach a search for congressional intent.188
181
Id. at 309 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (quoting Barnhart v. Walton,
535 U.S. 212, 222 (2002)).
182
Breyer, supra note 156, at 371–73.
183
United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 231 (2001). Mead famously restricted the application of
Chevron to cases where Congress explicitly delegated, and agencies followed, relatively formal procedures. See
id. at 226–27; Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond Marbury: The Executive’s Power to Say What the Law Is, 115 YALE
L.J. 2580, 2602–03 (2006).
184
Peter L. Strauss, Courts or Tribunals? Federal Courts and the Common Law, 53 ALA. L. REV. 891,
893 (2002).
185
Id.
186
Gluck & Bressman, Part II, supra note 5, at 791.
187
Walker, supra note 5, at 1421.
188
Gluck et al., supra note 134, at 1847; see also David J. Barron & Elena Kagan, Chevron’s
Nondelegation Doctrine, 2001 SUP. CT. REV. 201, 203 (2001) (“Given the difficulty of determining actual
congressional intent, some version of constructive—or perhaps more frankly said, fictional—intent must operate
in judicial efforts to delineate the scope of Chevron.”). It is worth noting that many of the factors used in the
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If judges wish to approach Chevron in a more contextual way despite the
institutional issues discussed earlier in this Part, as many judges undoubtedly
will, this Article provides new avenues that would allow them to do so in ways
that better reflect the realities of agency–Congress relationships and Congress’s
own chosen legislative process. In fact, this Article shows that pre-Chevron
courts used agency legislative history exactly this way, which could be helpful
to judges looking to return to a pre-Chevron mode of judicial deference. Before
Chevron, courts’ decisions of whether to defer to an agency’s interpretation were
contextual, and agency legislative history often played a role in determining this
context.189 Instead of looking at gaps or ambiguities as an automatic sign of
deference,190 these pre-Chevron courts sometimes used agency legislative
history to determine the relationship and interactions between an agency and
Congress at the time of enactment, which helped inform the court about whether
an ambiguity was a result of Congress’s intent to defer.191 For example, as
discussed above, courts looked at the fact that an agency proposed the legislation
or was involved in its drafting as a strong reason to defer to agency
interpretations.192 Courts also considered the fact that an agency proposal was
rejected as a signal not to defer,193 and they also looked at things like how close
in time the agency interpretation was to enactment when deciding whether to
uphold an agency’s interpretation.194 These types of factors could be instructive
for the current Supreme Court, which focuses on textual clues to determine
congressional intent to delegate, mostly ignoring the clues of congressional
intent that often lie in the exchanges between agencies and Congress.

various cases cited above did receive some support from respondents in Gluck and Bressman’s surveys. See
Gluck & Bressman, Part I, supra note 1, at 999–1004. Unfortunately, Gluck and Bressman did not ask about
agency legislative history, so we do not know how congressional staff feel about agency legislative
communications, although if the author’s interviews with agency staffers are correct, those communications are
an integral part of the legislative process through which congressional intent is formed.
189
See supra Part II.
190
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865–66 (1984); see also Cuozzo
Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2142 (2016) (“But where a statute leaves a ‘gap’ or is ‘ambigu[ous],’
we typically interpret it as granting the agency leeway to enact rules that are reasonable in light of the text,
nature, and purpose of the statute.”).
191
For example, where there was conflict between the agency and Congress during the legislative process,
a court could apply the Skidmore standard, which means it would independently judge the quality of the agency’s
interpretation where there is conflict between the agency and Congress. On the other hand, if it appeared that the
agency and Congress were on the same page with respect to the legislation, then a court could grant Chevrontype deference.
192
See supra Sections II.B.–II.C.
193
See supra Section II.B.
194
See cases cited supra note 60.
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Of course, agency legislative history can only serve as a useful tool of
judicial interpretation if it is available. One reason why it has not been used more
is that it is often not publicly available, as discussed above.195 If Congress began
to include more agency legislative history in its own congressional legislative
history, as this Article argues it should, it would become even easier for courts
to engage in a more contextual deference analysis. This would give courts a more
complete legislative picture, because the reality of the complex modern
legislative process is that Congress may have little choice but to rely on agency
expertise and capacity when forming its legislative expectations and intentions.
For judges looking to determine whether to defer on a case-by-case basis, agency
legislative history might be the best way to determine whether Congress
intended to delegate “authority to the agency to elucidate a specific provision of
the statute,” as the Court stated in Chevron.196
While judges might hesitate to dig into legislative history to decide whether
to defer to an agency interpretation because of the types of concerns described
earlier in this Part, arguments could be made that agency legislative history is in
some ways less problematic than other congressional legislative history. The
types of agency legislative history discussed in this Article are communicated in
a formal way to the relevant committees within Congress. There are two levels
of scrutiny for all agency legislative history, which has to be cleared through an
intra-agency process,197 while congressional legislative history is, at times,
subject to none. If an agency legislative staffer wanted to create deceptive
agency legislative history, it would require an incredible amount of coordination
within a large bureaucratic organization.198 To generate misleading agency
195

See infra Section II.E.
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843–44 (1984).
197
As discussed in Section II.A., agencies also engage in many informal communications with Congress
on the staff level, and it is possible that these types of communications could be more likely to be “cheap talk.”
That is one reason why this Article focuses only on formal agency legislative history. These formal
communications require a substantial agency drafting process and formal clearance that is likely to weed out
empty rhetoric about statutory language.
198
This is different from the concern often raised by textualists about a sneaky congressional staffer being
able to modify legislative history all on their own. As Justice Scalia argued, “[a]s anyone familiar with modernday drafting of congressional committee reports is well aware, the references to the cases were inserted, at best
by a committee staff member on his or her own initiative, and at worst by a committee staff member at the
suggestion of a lawyer-lobbyist; and the purpose of those references was not primarily to inform the Members
of Congress what the bill meant . . . but rather to influence judicial construction.” Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489
U.S. 87, 98–99 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); see also Frank H.
Easterbrook, Text, History, and Structure in Statutory Interpretation, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 61, 61 (1994)
(“These clues [in legislative history] are slanted, drafted by the staff and perhaps by private interest groups.”);
Gluck & Bressman, Part I, supra note 1, at 973 (showing that legislative drafters use legislative history to get
“something we couldn’t get in the statute in order to make key stakeholders happy”); Antonin Scalia & John F.
Manning, A Dialogue on Statutory and Constitutional Interpretation, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1610, 1612 (2012);
196
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legislative history that ends up in Congress’s legislative history, an agency
staffer would not only have to convince others within the agency to go along,
but would also have to sneak the misleading statement past the relevant
congressional committee to bias the legislative record.199 In the process of their
attempted deception, they run the risk of being discovered, which could cause
Congress to amend the statutory language in ways that could be even worse for
the agency. The agency and its staff would also lose their credibility for future
interactions with Congress.200 There are good reasons to think that agency
legislative history is a relatively accurate record of agency negotiations and deals
with Congress.
To illustrate this argument through a hypothetical example not dissimilar
from actual cases discussed above, suppose that an agency submitted proposed
legislation to Congress along with a section-by-section analysis of the
legislation, and Congress enacted the proposed legislation virtually unchanged
and incorporated the agency’s section-by-section analysis into a committee
report. Suppose a new President from a different political party is elected and
the agency then tries to interpret the statute in ways that go against what the
agency said in the section-by-section analysis because there is some plausible
ambiguity in the statute. Should a court defer to the agency interpretation under
Chevron because of the ambiguity? Rather than automatically deferring, a court
could check this political creep by looking to the agency legislative history that
gives insight into the deal Congress thought it was agreeing to at the time the

Starr, supra note 172 (“Lobbyists maneuver to get their clients’ opinions into the mass of legislative
materials . . . .”).
199
Those working on legislation inside an agency and inside Congress would have to coordinate with
regulators to generate the false legislative history to ensure that the regulators knew what to do and then they
would have to work with litigators to make sure they knew to point out the false agency legislative history to a
court if the agency’s interpretation was challenged. All of this would have to happen over a period of many years
because of the time it takes to enact legislation and for legal challenges to arise.
200
Agencies are repeat actors full of career employees who rely on positive relationships with Congress
to achieve their agency’s goals. Being uncovered as a dishonest actor would reduce the agency’s influence and
potentially subject staffers and the agency to increased scrutiny from Congress. Commentators have made similar
arguments about those within Congress who might attempt to use legislative history in devious ways.
McNollgast, Legislative Intent: The Use of Positive Political Theory in Statutory Interpretation, 57 L. &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 3, 26 (1994) (“In practice, political actors have two routes to enforce truthfulness. First,
members who prevaricate can be and occasionally are removed from gatekeeping positions, such as party
leadership or committee chairs. Second, because Congress passes a very large number of legislative provisions
each year, the same member is likely to be in a position of delegated authority on many occasions. To succeed
in accomplishing numerous legislative objectives over a lifetime in politics, a legislator will find it valuable to
develop a reputation for not taking strategic advantage when acting as an agent for other members.”); see also
Katzmann, supra note 63, at 654 (“The system works because committee members and their staffs will lose
influence with their colleagues as to future bills if they do not accurately represent the bills under consideration
within their jurisdiction.”).
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bill was passed. A textualist might still object to the use of legislative history in
this case on constitutional or institutional grounds, but it is clearly a harder
question in this circumstance, and the agency legislative history could cause
some judges to think twice about granting broad deference.
A recent example where the Court failed to recognize that the agency was
the initial drafter of the enacted text helps to illustrate how a court could use this
type of legislative history on a contextual basis. In Rumsfeld v. Forum for
Academic and Institutional Rights, Inc.,201 the Supreme Court considered
whether law schools are allowed to prohibit military representatives from
recruiting on campus because of the military’s then-existing “don’t ask, don’t
tell” policy.202 The case turned mostly on a question of constitutional law, but
the Court also considered a question of statutory interpretation in response to a
number of law professors who argued in an amicus brief that universities are
permitted to prohibit military recruiters under the statute.203 Neither the Court
nor the amici looked at the agency legislative history and, therefore, did not
know that the language in question was actually proposed by the DoD
specifically to require schools to allow military recruiters access to campus on
terms “at least equal in quality and scope to the access provided other potential
employers,” and that Congress adopted the DoD’s proposed language almost
verbatim.204 The language at issue was introduced in Congress the same day it
was sent from DoD to Congress.205 DoD’s draft bill was accompanied by a letter
to Congress, which was ultimately included as part of the House’s committee
report, explaining the purpose of the legislation.206 It seems clear from looking
at the agency legislative history that Congress and the DoD had an understanding
of what the bill was intended to do, and with this context it seems impossible
that Congress intended the bill to allow schools to ban military recruiters, as the
amicus brief argued. The Court’s position in favor of the DoD would have been
stronger if it had considered the agency legislative history, which provided
important context as to why Congress was enacting the legislation.
Agency legislative history may not always speak directly to whether
Congress intended to defer in a particular case, but it can still be informative to
201

547 U.S. 47, 51 (2006).
Id. at 52.
203
Id. at 55–56 (“Certain law professors participating as amici, however, argue that the Government and
FAIR misinterpret the statute.”).
204
Id. at 54. For the agency’s proposal, see DEP’T OF DEF., NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR
FISCAL YEAR 2005 (2004), http://ogc.osd.mil/olc/docs/March12-Text.pdf.
205
Compare DEP’T OF DEF., supra note 204 (showing date legislation was sent to Congress), with H.R.
REP. NO. 108-443, pt. 1, at 4 (2004) (showing date legislation was proposed in Congress).
206
H.R. REP. NO. 108-443, pt. 1, at 7 (2004).
202
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courts even when it is not directly on point. It can serve as a strong indicator of
whether the relationship between an agency and Congress is collaborative or
combative with respect to certain parts of that legislation, which is relevant to
determining Congress’s intent. When Congress rejects agency proposals, it
probably does not view the agency as a partner in creating the legislation, and
courts could therefore be more skeptical of agency interpretations of that
legislation. For example, if an agency wanted Congress to create legislation that
was drafted in a certain way and Congress instead decided to draft it a different
way, a court could view agency actions with respect to that legislation more
circumspectly to ensure that the agency is not trying to do something
administratively that it could not get legislatively. This is similar to the way
some courts already treat rejected proposals in statutory interpretation
generally.207 Similarly, when Congress disregards an agency’s views and passes
a bill despite agency opposition, some judges might find it incongruous to then
give strong deference to the agency’s interpretation. An assumption of an intent
to defer in this circumstance leaves the agency abundant interpretive space even
though the risk of agency subversion is high because the agency gets a second
chance to “win” in implementation.208 Courts may therefore want to be on guard
207
See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 579 (2006); FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.,
529 U.S. 120, 125–26 (2000); Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 176–78 (1989); INS v. CardozaFonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 442–43 (1987); United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, 474 U.S. 121, 137 (1985);
United States v. Yermian, 468 U.S. 63, 72 (1984) (relying on congressional adoption of broadening language of
false swearing statute after earlier bill was vetoed by President); Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 174–75
(1976) (relying on the fact that the Senate had rejected attempts to override an interpretation as support for that
interpretation); Blau v. Lehman, 368 U.S. 403, 411–12 (1962); Mont. Wilderness Ass’n v. U.S. Forest Serv.,
314 F.3d 1146, 1150 (9th Cir. 2003). For a deeper discussion of the rejected proposal rule, see ESKRIDGE, JR. ET
AL., supra note 3, at 831. Not all judges find the rejected proposal canon persuasive because legislative inaction
can occur for a number of reasons that are unclear to courts. See, e.g., Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715,
750 (2006) (“Congress takes no governmental action except by legislation. What the dissent refers to as
‘Congress’[s] deliberate acquiescence’ should more appropriately be called Congress’s failure to express any
opinion.”); Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook Cty. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159, 170 (2001) (“A
bill can be proposed for any number of reasons, and it can be rejected for just as many others. The relationship
between the actions and inactions of the 95th Congress and the intent of the 92d Congress in passing Section
404(a) is also considerably attenuated.”); Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A.,
511 U.S. 164, 187 (1994) (“[F]ailed legislative proposals are ‘a particularly dangerous ground on which to rest
an interpretation of a prior statute.’”); Pattern Makers’ League of N. Am. v. NLRB, 473 U.S. 95, 110–12 (1985)
(finding the legislative history too ambiguous to influence the Court’s decision). Some scholars have also been
critical of the rule. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., Interpreting Legislative Inaction, 87 MICH. L. REV. 67,
84–95 (1988) (collecting cases using and declining to use the rejected proposal rule). These challenges could
also apply to rejected agency legislative proposals, because agencies make many legislative proposals and it is
hard to know why any particular proposal is rejected. Not every rejected proposal is significant, but many are,
especially when Congress proceeds to pass legislation on the same topic.
208
On the other hand, recall the Cuozzo case, described above, where the Court relied on Chevron to defer
to the USPTO. See supra Section II.B. In that case, Chevron’s presumption made sense in light of the agency
legislative history. There was ample evidence of a cooperative relationship between the USPTO and Congress
and an intent to delegate to the USPTO. Although the agency legislative history would not have changed the
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to ensure that the agency is acting in accordance with Congress’s preferences
rather than the agency’s conflicting preferences. On the other hand, where an
agency supported a bill, or opposed a bill and Congress made changes to appease
the agency, a court could view that as a reason to grant greater deference to
agency interpretations, as courts have in the past.209 Agency legislative history
may not always allow courts to determine actual congressional intent with
certainty, but it may allow courts to craft a more accurate constructive
congressional intent.210
B. Implications for Interpretation
1. Interpreting Statutes in Light of Agency Legislative History
Whether a judge prefers broad deference or greater judicial scrutiny, they
still must engage with the text of a statute to determine its possible meanings.211
Agency legislative history often provides useful evidence of the understanding
reached between an agency and Congress, especially when it has been
incorporated into congressional legislative history. Even a judge who prefers
broad deference could check the agency legislative history to make sure an
agency is not acting in ways that go against the representations the agency made
to Congress. If the agency legislative history contains relevant explanations from
agencies to Congress or descriptions of how a provision would be carried out,
and Congress included that in a committee report or elsewhere in the

Court’s decision, it would have strengthened it by situating it within the empirical reality of how the bill came
to be rather than an assumption that may or may not have been true. See supra Section II.B.
209
See supra Part III.
210
One concrete way in which courts have attempted to approach Chevron on a case-by-case basis is
through the application of the major questions doctrine. This doctrine presumes that Congress does not intend
to delegate issues of major importance to agencies without explicitly doing so, and instead keeps the
interpretation of those provisions to the court. See Kevin O. Leske, Major Questions About the “Major
Questions” Doctrine, 5 MICH. J. ENVTL. & ADMIN. L. 479, 480 (2016). This doctrine was an important part of
the majority’s decision in King v. Burwell, which stated that it was inconceivable that Congress would have left
a question of such “deep ‘economic and political significance’” to an agency without expressly doing so. 135 S.
Ct. 2480, 2489 (2015). While the wisdom of allowing courts to determine whether an issue is “major” enough
to do away with deference is certainly debatable, if courts are to engage in this type of inquiry then they would
be better served by considering agency legislative history to determine whether such an issue had actually been
contemplated. Perhaps the agency legislative history contains a discussion of the major issue or perhaps the
agency pointed out the major issue and Congress still chose not to amend the legislation. Before a court decides
that an issue is too major for Congress to have left it to an agency, it could check the agency legislative history
to confirm that Congress in fact had not considered the issue, in much the same way courts check congressional
legislative history before applying the absurdity doctrine to make sure that the absurdity was not intentional.
211
The Court has accepted evidence of statutory purpose, “including those revealed in part by legislative
and regulatory history,” to determine whether a statute is ambiguous at Chevron step one. See City of Arlington
v. FCC, 569 U.S. 290, 310 (2013); see also Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. at 143–47.
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Congressional Record, it would make sense for a court to make an analysis of
those communications an important part of its interpretation process. Courts
could engage these materials at step one of Chevron when deciding whether
Congress intended a single meaning for the text, or at step two of Chevron when
deciding whether the agency’s interpretation was “reasonable.”212 Or if a court
determines that Chevron should not apply, it could include agency legislative
history as part of the many factors it considers under a Skidmore analysis.213
Agency legislative history has ramifications for the ongoing debate about
the use of legislative history generally. One previously unknown consequence
of judges’ increased skepticism towards legislative history is that they might be
missing not only congressional legislative history but also the agency legislative
history incorporated into congressional documents. Members of Congress and
their staff know that agencies read legislative history, so Congress may use its
own legislative history to memorialize an understanding reached with an agency
and to hold the agency to the bargain it made during the legislative process, and
courts who ignore legislative history need to be aware that they might also be
ignoring the best evidence of agency–Congress legislative deals.214 It would
seem that even a textualist judge would view agency legislative history as
distinct from other legislative history. Textualists are concerned about individual
members or staffers using Congress’s legislative history to do an “end run”
around the constitutionally prescribed process,215 but by ignoring agency
legislative history and deferring to agency interpretations, courts are potentially
allowing agencies to do an “end run” around Congress.
Courts have already shown how agency legislative history could be used in
interpretation. Recall United States v. Vogel and Piper v. Chris-Craft, two pre-

212
Cf. Strauss, “Chevron Space” and “Skidmore Weight”, supra note 26, at 1163 (arguing that
determinations of whether an agency interpretation is “reasonable” might consider whether the agency’s
interpretation is consistent with statutory purposes). Courts have disagreed about whether to consult legislative
history at step one or step two of Chevron. Compare Halverson v. Slater, 129 F.3d 180, 184 (D.C. Cir. 1997)
(holding that “the lower court erred by failing to ‘exhaust the traditional tools of statutory construction,”
including legislative history, at Chevron step one), with Cohen v. JP Morgan Chase & Co., 498 F.3d 111, 122
(2d Cir. 2007) (“This court has generally been reluctant to employ legislative history at step one of Chevron
analysis, mindful that the ‘interpretive clues’ to be found in such history will rarely speak with sufficient clarity
to permit us to conclude ‘beyond reasonable doubt’ that Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at
issue.”). The distinction is unlikely to matter in whether a court upholds an agency interpretation.
213
Courts would still need to distinguish reliable from unreliable agency legislative history in much the
same way they already do for congressional legislative history.
214
Congressional staff confirm that legislative history is often written with agencies as the intended
audience. See Gluck & Bressman, Part II, supra note 5, at 789–90.
215
Manning, supra note 34, at 1534.
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Chevron Supreme Court cases discussed above.216 In both of these cases, the
Court relied on agency legislative history to overturn an agency interpretation of
an ambiguous statute because the agency legislative history showed that the
agency’s interpretation went against contemporaneous agency–Congress
communications, even though the statute itself was ambiguous.217 And in many
other cases discussed above, the agency legislative history was helpful in
showing that the agency’s interpretation was consistent with its statements to
Congress, and the Court therefore upheld the interpretations.218 These types of
inquiries may require courts to conduct a more searching and purposivist judicial
inquiry in many circumstances, which is subject to all of the caveats discussed
above about courts’ competency to recreate complicated legislative deals. In
many ways this is not that different from what courts often already do, since
courts have frequently relied on legislative history in Chevron cases,219 but this
Article’s proposals provide a different perspective on how to view those
materials. It is up to a court to decide how much weight to give to agency
legislative history in any particular case, and this Article provides a place from
where they can start.220

216

See supra Sections II.E.1.–II.E.2.
See supra Sections II.E.1.–II.E.2.
218
See supra Part II.
219
See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference: Supreme Court
Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan, 96 GEO. L.J. 1083, 1136 (2008)
(collecting statistics on the use of legislative history in Chevron cases).
220
The conventional wisdom is that committee and conference reports are by far the most reliable
legislative history, followed by on-the-record statements by the members of Congress who sponsored or
supported the bill. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., supra note 3, at 631; ESKRIDGE, JR., supra note 4, at 221–22; ROBERT
A. KATZMANN, JUDGING STATUTES 35–54 (2014); MANNING & STEPHENSON, supra note 3, at 136 (“The
conventional wisdom has been that the most reliable form of legislative history consists of the reports prepared
by the House and Senate committees, which accompany bills favorably reported to the chamber, and the
conference committee reports which accompany the reconciled version of the House and Senate bills.”);
Costello, supra note 1, at 43–50 (discussing the importance of conference committee reports). For example,
Justice Jackson objected to the use of legislative history generally but made an exception for committee reports.
See Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384, 395 (1951) (Jackson, J., concurring). As Justice
Frankfurter remarked, “[w]hatever we may think about the loose use of legislative history, it has never been
questioned that reports of committees and utterances of those in charge of legislation constitute authoritative
exposition of the meaning of legislation.” Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 U.S. 83, 98 (1953) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting). Quantitative analyses confirm that committee reports are relied on far more than other kinds of
legislative history. See, e.g., James J. Brudney & Corey Ditslear, The Warp and Woof of Statutory Interpretation:
Comparing Supreme Court Approaches in Tax Law and Workplace Law, 58 DUKE L.J. 1231, 1262 (2009)
(discussing the prevalence of committee reports used in tax law and workplace law cases); Jorge L. Carro &
Andrew R. Brann, The U.S. Supreme Court and the Use of Legislative Histories: A Statistical Analysis, 22
JURIMETRICS J. 294, 304 (1982) (reporting that, over the forty year period analyzed by the authors, over 60% of
the Supreme Court’s citations to legislative history were references to committee reports).
217
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2. Agency Legislative History and Empirical Realities of the Legislative
Process
Agency legislative history also has bearing on many recent debates about the
role empirical realities of the legislative process should play in statutory
interpretation. It turns out that recent empirical work likely undersells the
complexity of the legislative process. For example, both the author’s own
research and Professors Gluck and Bressman’s studies revealed the important
role Congress’s non-partisan, professional statutory drafters in the House and
Senate Offices of Legislative Counsel play in drafting statutory text, but not
legislative history.221 Under this account, congressional staff develop a basic
legislative plan and then turn it over to legislative counsel to draft the statutory
particulars, with the congressional staff drafting accompanying legislative
history explaining the bill. While this is certainly an accurate reflection of how
the process works in some cases, agency legislative history seems to indicate
that the process is often more complicated, with agencies sometimes drafting
statutory language and legislative history. The simplified account of the
legislative process likely reflects reality only for short, simple, single-subject
bills, which have become increasingly rare in recent years. For more complex
bills, agencies are often involved in creating the legislative plan, drafting the
actual statutory text, and making significant revisions to statutory text.222
Agency legislative history also seems to indicate that legislative counsel might
not be substantively knowledgeable enough to draft well in all circumstances,
and they must rely on agency input in many cases to get the legislative language
to work. This is unsurprising given the small number of relatively generalist
legislative counsel as compared to the large number of agency experts involved
in the legislative process.
Not only are agencies closely involved in drafting statutes, it also turns out
that agencies often draft legislative history, which calls into question the clean
division of labor between congressional staff and legislative counsel. For
example, Professor Gluck notes that the section-by-section summary of a statute
is generally considered to be one of the most important pieces of legislative
history and claims that this section-by-section analysis is drafted by committee
221
See Shobe, Intertemporal Statutory Interpretation, supra note 5, at 861–65; Abbe R. Gluck, Congress,
Statutory Interpretation, and the Failure of Formalism: The CBO Canon and Other Ways that Courts Can
Improve on What They Are Already Trying to Do, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 177, 208–09 (2017) [hereinafter Gluck,
Congress] (describing the Gluck and Bressman study and its findings that congressional staffers “make the
policy and sketch out statutory contours, often in the form of policy ‘bullet points.’ The nonpartisan Legislative
Counsels then take over and turn the ‘asks’ into statute-ese”).
222
See supra Part II.

SHOBE_PROOFS2

332

1/14/2019 2:20 PM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 68:283

staff, not legislative counsel.223 The findings here complicate this somewhat. It
appears that these section-by-section analyses are at least sometimes drafted by
agency staff rather than congressional staff, and that congressional staff merely
import the agency’s words into the committee report. Committee reports, like
statutory text, appear to be the result of a long legislative process that often
indirectly and directly incorporates materials from agencies, and probably from
other outside groups too.224 That Congress incorporates agency legislative
history into its own legislative history is likely meant to guide the agency’s
implementation, which provides support for the contention that agencies are
often Congress’s intended audience for legislative history.225 We cannot know
why and how often this occurs without further investigation of the process, and
this certainly merits further investigation. For purposes of this Article it is
sufficient to note that this phenomenon exists, and that it complicates many of
the apparently oversimplified understandings we have about the origins of
legislative history. Much like with statutory text, the generation of legislative
history is the result of a messy and ununiform process. If scholars and judges
want to rely on source arguments to support or oppose the use of legislative
history, agency legislative history suggests that more work must be done to
understand how legislative history is generated.
CONCLUSION
Scholars and judges need a more contextual understanding of how statutes
are created, with a greater emphasis on the role of agencies in creating them.
Agency legislative history provides important context and has broad
implications for statutory interpretation and agency delegation. The typology of
agency legislative history presented here gives courts and scholars a roadmap

223
See Gluck, Congress, supra note 221, at 209 (“The section-by-section is drafted by committee staff
(the policy staff, not the Legislative Counsels) . . . .”).
224
Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87, 98–99 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment) (“As anyone familiar with modern-day drafting of congressional committee reports is well aware, the
references to the cases were inserted, at best by a committee staff member on his or her own initiative, and at
worst by a committee staff member at the suggestion of a lawyer-lobbyist; and the purpose of those references
was not primarily to inform the Members of Congress what the bill meant . . . but rather to influence judicial
construction.”).
225
Strauss, When the Judge Is Not the Primary, supra note 156, at 329–35. Professors Gluck and
Bressman’s respondents almost uniformly agreed with the idea that one purpose of legislative history is to shape
the way agencies interpret statutory ambiguities. Gluck & Bressman, Part II, supra note 5, at 768. Congress may
adopt agency legislative history as a tool of oversight that is contemporaneous with the enactment of the statute,
unlike other means of post-enactment oversight like congressional hearings. For a discussion of tools of
congressional oversight, see Mathew D. McCubbins et al., Structure and Process, Politics and Policy:
Administrative Arrangements and the Political Control of Agencies, 75 VA. L. REV. 431, 432–45 (1989).
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for how they can more accurately account for legislative realities in their theories
and the practice of statutory interpretation and agency delegation.

